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ABSTRACT 
 
The changes in the early 1990s at the international, regional and domestic 
levels made it inevitable to study Turkish-Iranian relations separately after 
1990. This study categorizes the relations into bilateral issues, regional issues 
and economic relations. Turkish-Iranian relations have a multi-dimensional 
structure and there were ups and downs in the course of the relations through 
the 1990s. The relations continued on an uncertain ground. Looking to the 
future, there are incentives for cooperation on the one hand and obstacles to 
cooperation on the other. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 v 
 
 
 
 
ÖZET 
 
1990’ların başındaki uluslar arası ve bölgesel seviyedeki ve iki ülke içindeki 
gelişmeler Türk-İran ilişkilerini 1990 sonrası ayrıca incelemeyi kaçınılmaz 
kılmaktadır. Bu çalışma ilişkileri ikili konular, bölgesel konular ve ekonomik 
ilişkiler olmak üzere kategorize ederek inceler. Türk-İran ilişkileri çok yönlü 
bir yapıya sahiptir ve ilişkilerin seyrinde 1990’lar boyunca iniş ve çıkışlar 
görülmüştür. İlişkiler belirsiz bir zemin üzerinde devam etmiştir. Geleceğe 
baktığımızda bir tarafta işbirliği için güdüleyici sebepler mevcutken diğer 
tarafta engeller bulunmaktadır. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF RELATIONS 
 
This chapter will give some basic information for the readers who are 
not familiar with the topic.  Foreign policies of Iran and Turkey will be 
explained along with their institutions in policy making, as well as basic 
determinants and the historical development of their foreign policies. Then, 
historical development of Turkish-Iranian relations till the 1990s will be 
summarized in the following parts. This will constitute a background, which 
will help better understand the period after 1990. Finally, changes in the early 
1990s, which effect the relations of the two countries, will be explained. These 
changes led to the significance of examining Turkish-Iranian relations 
separately after 1990.  
 
1.1. Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy 
1.1.1. Institutions which shape Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
In order to understand Iranian foreign policy, it should be better to 
begin with analyzing the institutions which play a role in decision making. This 
analysis shows the plurality of these institutions,  which makes it harder to 
understand and make predictions about Iranian foreign policy. These 
institutions are as follows: 
 
a) The Constitution: Iranian constitution draws the main lines of the principles 
and objectives of Iranian foreign policy. Chapter 10 of the Iranian constitution 
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deals with the foreign policy principles of the Islamic Republic. The Iranian 
constitution rejects any form of domination, any foreign control over the 
country, suggests non-alignment with respect to the superpowers, supports the 
struggle of the opressed nations against hegemons, and is concerned with the 
Muslim populations all over the world.1 
 
b. The Supreme Leader: The leader is always effective in foreign policy 
formulation of Iran despite the decline of his power after the death of Ayetollah 
Khomeini.2 His rights and duties were mentioned in the constitution as 
delineation of general policies of the Islamic Republic, supervision of the 
proper execution of laws, supreme command of the armed forces and 
declaration of war and peace.3 The leadership affects  foreign policy making 
through its dominant power over the Expediency Council and the Experts 
Assembly.4  
 
c. The Government: The government in Iran is composed of the president, the 
council of ministers and the Supreme Council for National Security (NSC). 
The president has a privileged role and became more effective in foreign policy 
with amendments to the constitution after the death of Khomeini in 1989. NSC 
aims to provide cooperation between different institutions of foreign policy 
decision making.5  
                                                 
1See articles 152, 153, 154, 155 in Iran Constitution: p.39 ; available from 
http://www.aghayan.com.html; Internet; accessed 23 April 2002. 
2 Ramazan Kılınç, “ Iran Dış Politikasının Evrimi: Körfezde Arap-Iran İlişkileri Örneği” 
Liberal Düşünce (2001): p.165. 
3 Iran Constitution, p.30. 
4 Jalil Roshendal, “Iran’s Foreign and Security Policies” Security Dialogue 31, no.1. (2000) : 
p.106. Experts Assembly interprets the constitution and elects the president. Expediency 
Council has a conciliatory role between the parliament and Guardians Council. 
5 Kılınç, p.165. 
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d. The Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis): According to article 84 of the 
constitution every representative has the right to express his views on all 
external affairs of the country.6 The role of the Assembly decreased since most 
of its rights were given to the president after amendments to the constitution 
in1989.7 
 
e. The Foreign Ministry: It functions as an office, which has a role both in 
making and implementing foreign policy decisions in accordance with the 
guidance of the above mentioned institutions.8  
 
2.2. Principles and Objectives of Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
The main principles and objectives of Iran were summarized in Article 
152 of the Constitution:  
 
The foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based upon the rejection of 
all forms of domination, both the exertion of it and submission to it, the 
preservation of the independence of the country in all respects and its territorial 
integrity, the defense of the rights of all Muslims, non-alignment with respect to 
the hegemonic superpowers, and the maintenance of mutually peacefully 
relations with all non-belligerent States.9 
  
Post revolutionary Iran aimed firstly to provide for the territorial integrity 
and political independence of the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic 
                                                 
6 Iran Constitution, p.25. 
7 Kılınç, p.166. 
8 Roshendal, p.106. 
9 Iran Constitution, p.39. 
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rejected any superpower domination and intervention. The presence of any 
foreign military base in Iran was forbidden in the constitution.10 The US and 
Israel have always been potential threats. The US military presence in the 
Persian Gulf is defined as foreign occupation and is regarded as the main 
source of instability in the region. Accordingly, the vital interests of the US 
prevail over what is best for the region.11    
 
The Islamic Republic insisted on a Muslim identity and was concerned 
about the rights of Muslims not only in Iran but also all over the world. The 
Iranian revolution was not seen bound only with Iran but there was also a 
policy to export the revolution. This was precisely mentioned in the preamble 
to the constitution: 
 
The Constitution, having regard to the Islamic contents of the Iranian 
Revolution, which was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the 
arrogant, provides a basis for the continuation of that revolution both inside and 
outside the country. It particularly tries to do this in developing international 
relations with other Islamic movements and peoples, so as to prepare the way 
towards a united single world community. 12 
 
 
2.3. From Khomeini to Khatemi: Change in Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
Khomeini, as the leader of the revolution, followed hard line policies in 
the 1980s with the popular support of the revolutionary generation in Iran. 
                                                 
10 See Article 146 of  Iran Constitution, p.38. 
11 Mohammad Larijani, “Iran’s Foreign Policy: Principles and Objectives” The Iranian Journal 
Of International Affairs 7, no.4. (1996): p.759-763 and Abbas Maleki, “ The Islamic Republic 
of Iran’s Foreign Policy: The View from Iran,” The Iranian Journal of International Affairs 7, 
no.4. (1996):p.753. 
12 Iran Constitution, p.5. 
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Khomeini described his policy as ‘Neither West nor East’13 and isolated Iran 
from the world community. This policy created enemies for Iran both from the 
West and the East.  He called the US the ‘Great Satan’ and strained the 
relations with the US.  On the other hand, his description of the Iranian 
revolution as a starting point14 and his willingness to spread it to other Muslim 
countries made the Muslim populated countries worry about Iran’s intervention 
in their internal affairs. 
 
When Hashemi Rafsanjani came to power in 1989, Iranian economy 
was seriously affected by the long Iran-Iraq war (1981-1988). Therefore, 
Rafsanjani gave priority to recover the economy. Instead of idealistic policies 
aiming to export the revolution, Rafsanjani and his colleagues believed that 
Iran should be a ‘model’ for other Islamic countries by successfully 
establishing its Islamic system in Iran on social, economic and political 
structures.15   He understood that economic recovery could not succeed with 
the policy of isolation. He abandoned the radicals’ concept of Islamic 
economics and resumed ties with the International Monetary Fund, borrowed 
from the World Bank and implemented economic reforms recommended by 
those organizations.16  There emerged two dominant groups effecting Iranian 
foreign policy: Radicals and moderates. Radicals insisted on continuing the 
hard line policies of Khomeini, while moderates emphasized the requests of 
people for development and participation, and integrating to the world 
                                                 
13 Roshendal, p.107. 
14 İhsan D. Dağı, Ortadoğu’da İslam ve Siyaset. (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları,1998),  p.74. 
15 Ibid., p.77. 
16 Daniel Pipes and Patrick Clawson,“Ambitious Iran, Troubled Neighbors” Foreign Affairs 72, 
iss.1 (1993-1994) : p.2. 
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economy. The direction of foreign policy followed a dual path, which shifted 
from one to another. 
 
The factors led to the new approaches in the foreign policy of the 1990s 
can be summarized as global and internal. Globalization brought 
interdependence, competitiveness and transparency. All these made it more 
difficult for Iran to continue with its isolation from the world.17 Internally, the 
aspirations of Iranian people, especially the youth, for a better life in terms of 
economic development and a freer social and political life became apparent in 
the 1990s18. Of course, the decision makers had to respond to these.      
 
Among the candidates of the 1997 elections in Iran, Mohammed 
Khatemi, who represented these requests of the Iranian people, was elected as 
the president of Iran. Khatemi began to spell the concept of ‘democracy at 
home and peace abroad’. He advocated a proactive and firm foreign policy, 
which was based on non- violence and friendly relations with all countries as 
long as they reciprocated. 19 
 
The starting point of Khatemi’s new policy was the Organization of 
Islamic Conference meeting in Tehran in December 1997. At that meeting, he 
tried to erase Iran’s image of exporting the revolution and interfering in other 
Muslim countries’ internal affairs. In that regard, he said in his speech: “our 
                                                 
17 Shahram Chubin, “ Iran’s Strategic Predicament” The Middle East Journal 54, no.1. (2000) : 
p.3. 
18 R.K.Ramazani, “ The Shifting Premise of Iran’s Foreign Policy: Towards a Democratic 
Peace” Middle East Journal 52, no.2. (1998) :p.178. 
19 Ibid. P.181. 
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civil society neither seeks to dominate others nor to submit to domination.”20 In 
order to respond to the requests of the Iranian people for better life standards, 
he had to deal with economic development. Opening to the world market was 
the key point for Iran whose economy is highly dependent on the oil and gas 
sectors. He focused on economic cooperation with the European countries. 
This was tightened with the partial lifting of the embargo by the US for 
European firms to invest in Iran.21  In the end of the 1990s, Iran became 
enthusiastic about participating more in world markets in exportation and 
transportation of oil and natural gas.22 While there were all these efforts to 
integrate with the world and Khatami’s words to the effect of a will to start a 
dialogue between the peoples of Iran and the US, there is still hostility in Iran 
at the state level towards the US and Israel.23 Anti-Americanism and anti-
Zionism are usually used in Iran as an ideological support for the continuation 
and legitimacy of the regime.24In his interview on Cable News Network (CNN) 
on January 1998, Khatemi said: ‘When I speak of dialogue, I intend dialogue 
between civilizations and cultures, but the dialogue between civilizations and 
nations is different from political relations.’ 25 The conservative wing is much 
harder against the US. The supreme leader, Ali Khamanei said: ‘The correct 
way of avoiding the domination on Iran of a power like America… was to raise 
a solid and high wall in America’s way… Negotiating with a domineering 
                                                 
20 Ramazani, p.183. 
21 Mahmood Monshipouri, “ Iran’s Search for the New Pragmatism” Middle East Policy 6, 
no.2. (1998) : p.195. 
22 Bijan Khajehpour and Siamak Namazi, “Pres Reflects Politics in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran,” Middle East Insight (1999) :p.52-53. 
23 Ramazani, p.183. 
24 Turan Moralı, “Turkey and Iran” Conference in the Foreign Policy Institute, Ankara, March 
2002. 
25 CNN, 7 January 1998 in Charles Kurzman, “Soft on Satan: Challenges for Iranian –US 
Relations” Middle East Policy 6, no.1. (1998) : p.71. 
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power like America is worse than  having ties.’26 Because the strong opposition 
of the conservatives, and the institutional and constitutional constraints, 
Khatemi had to admit the difficulties to make  reforms in Iran:  ‘I must admit 
that after three and a half years in the presidency, I am aware that the head of 
state does not have the adequate prerogatives to do this job.’27 
 
 
1.2. Understanding Turkish Foreign Policy 
1.2.1. Institutions which shape Turkish Foreign Policy 
 
a) The Foreign Ministry: It has an influential role in the decision making 
process of Turkish foreign policy. There is a historically rooted foreign policy 
culture among the officials of the foreign ministry. Turkish governments 
usually carefully take their ideas into consideration. 
 
b) The Military: Turkish military is highly sensitive about the preservation of 
the secular Atatürkist state. Therefore, any foreign policy, which is perceived 
as a threat to the Turkish regime, is objected by the military. The military joins 
foreign policy making through the National Security Council (NSC), which is 
composed of the president, the prime minister and some leading ministers on 
the civilian side, and the Chief of General Staff and some leading commanders 
on the military side. NSC has a ‘prior advisory’ role in foreign policy making 
                                                 
26 Reuters, 4 February 1998 in Kurzman, p.71. 
27 Suzanne Maloney in “Symposium: US Policy Towards Iran, Time for a Change?” Middle 
East Policy 8, no.1. (2001) : p.5. 
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according to the constitution.28 Because of the special influence of the military 
over the government in Turkey, such advice is carefully implemented.  
 
c) The Parliament: The constitution gives the right to the members of the 
parliament to participate in foreign policy making.29 The Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, which is composed of parliaments from the 
parties represented in the parliament, studies and prepares reports on foreign 
policy issues of Turkey.    
 
d) The Council of Ministers: It is responsible towards the parliament for the 
maintenance of national security and the preparation of the armed forces for the 
defense of the country.30 
 
1.2.2. Foreign Policy of the Turkish Republic  
 
After the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, Turkey 
focused its energy on internal development and sought to avoid foreign 
tensions that could divert it from that goal.31 Turkish foreign policy makers 
attributed their foreign policy to Atatürk’s saying ‘peace at home, peace 
abroad’. Turkey participated in the Balkan Pact in 1934 and the Sadabad Pact 
in 1937 in order to secure itself from the growing threats of Italy and Germany. 
                                                 
28 See Article 118 of the Turkish Constitution in Seref Gözübüyük, Son Değisikliklerle TC 
1982 Anayasasi (Ankara : Turhan Kitabevi, 1999), p.112. 
29 See Articles 87, 90 and 92 of the Turkish Constitution in Ibid.,  p.86-91. 
30 See Article 117 of the Turkish Constitution in Ibid., p.111. 
31 Alan Makovsky, “ The New Activism in Turkish Foreign Policy,” SAIS Review 19, no.1 
(1999): p.93. 
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It succeeded to remain neutral during the Second World War with President 
İsmet Inönü’s balanced policies.  
 
 Turkey felt insecure after the war with the emergence of a stronger 
Soviet Republic. Soviets’ aim of exporting the communist regime and Stalin’s 
claims on Turkish territory concerned the politicians in Turkey. Therefore, 
Turkey participated in the Western alliance with its membership to NATO in 
1952. In addition to this, contemporary civilization was in the West at that 
time, while its eastern neighbors were not completely sovereign states yet. 
Therefore, Turkey invested its future in the West.  Its strategic alliance with the 
West was the main determinant of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey took 
financial and military aid from the US throughout   the Cold War.  
 
The main principle of Turkey’s Middle East policy was to avoid 
interference with that region’s affairs.32The Jupiter missile issue of 1962, the 
Cyprus issue of 1964 and 1974 were the events that led to crises with Turkey’s 
alliance with the West. As a reaction to these events and Turkey’s sensitivity to 
the Palestinian issue, there was a move towards a rapprochement with the 
Middle East in Turkish foreign policy during these years.33  
 
 The early 1990s was dominated by Turgut Özal’s (1983-1993) new 
activism on Turkish foreign policy. However, the military and Foreign 
Ministry wanted the continuation of traditional cautious policies. The following 
                                                 
32 Pınar Bilgin and Bilge Criss, “ Turkish Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East” Middle East 
Review of International Relations 1, iss.1 (1997), (e-journal) 
http//wwwc.cc.columbia.edu/sec/dlc/ciao/olj/meria/meria97_criss.html 
33  Ibid. 
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years showed that Turkish foreign policy kept on its traditional course. The aim 
of being a member of the European Union together with continuation of its 
strategic alliance with the US constituted the main direction of Turkish foreign 
policy in the late 1990s. 
 
 
1.3. A Brief Historical Background of Turkish-Iranian Relations until the 
1990s34 
 
There was a struggle between Safavid Persian Shiism and Ottoman 
Sünni Islam till the 18th century. After wars that lasted for one and a half 
centuries, they agreed to live as sovereign states in autonomous parts of the 
Islamic world community.35 During the First World War, both sides 
experienced imperial intervention and internal fragmentation. After the war, 
their main concern was to maintain their territorial integrity, political authority 
and independent foreign policy. The leaders of both sides, Kemal Atatürk and 
Reza Shah , followed the way of westernization in order to succeed with 
development.36 
  
 After the Second World War, Soviet communism was a common threat 
for both countries and they chose to cooperate with the Western Alliance. Both 
of them were important countries for the US policy of containment. As 
                                                 
34 For a chronological list of the main events in Turkish-Iranian relations between 1922 and 
1994, see Nezih Tavlaş, “Türk-Iran İlişkileri Kronolojisi,” Strateji1 (1995). 
35 Graham Fuller, “Orta Asya’da İki Rakip: İran ve Türkiye,” Strateji 1 (1995): p.174, and John 
Calabrese,  “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 25, no.1 (1998):p.2. 
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founding members the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), they became 
regional allies. During the 1950s, Turkey occupied a special position in the 
eyes of the West and its military capability surpassed that of Iran. However, 
this was not a significant concern in Iran, because none of the sides regarded 
the other as its primary regional adversary. Their security concerns were 
focused on Greece for Turkey and on radical Arabs for Iran.37 Then in 1964, 
they established the Regional Cooperation and Development grouping (RCD), 
which became Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) in 1985. By the mid 
1970s, Iran became a regional power with its increasing oil profits and massive 
arms acquisitions. Since Iran’s military and economic interests were projected 
mainly towards the Persian Gulf, Turkish concerns disappeared.38 
 
 However, the revolution of 1979 changed Turkey’s perception of Iran. 
Iran did not only reject the Western Alliance, but it also followed hostile 
policies towards the US. Additionally, the Islamic nature of the regime and its 
policy of exporting the revolution to the other Muslim countries concerned 
Turkey. The positive contribution of the Iranian revolution for Turkey was to 
increase its declining   importance in the eyes of the US as a strategic partner in 
the region against the Iranian regime.39  However, Turkey’s new perception of 
Iran did not effect the bilateral relations in the 1980s. Turkey did not 
participate in the US embargo of 1980 to Iran, referring to the special nature of 
Turkish-Iranian relations and its national economic interests.40 Meanwhile, Iran 
                                                                                                                                 
36 Atilla Eralp and Özlem Tür, “Iran’la Devrim Sonrası İlişkiler” in Türkiye ve Ortadoğu Tarih 
Kimlik Güvenlik, ed.Meliha B. Altunışık (İstanbul: Boyut Kitapları, 1999): p.70. 
37 Calabrese, p.2. 
38 Ibid., p.3. 
39 Eralp and Tur, p.72. 
40 Ibid., p.76. 
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was seriously busy with the Iran-Iraq War of 1981-1988. With its policies of 
active neutrality and pragmatic activism, Turkey managed to increase its 
exports to Iran to an unprecented amount.41 In 1984, the two countries signed a 
security agreement, according to which none of the sides would allow activities 
on its territory against the security of the other. Accordingly, PKK activities on 
Iranian territory were limited in the 1980s.42 
 
1.4. What Changed in the 1990s Effecting the Turkish-Iranian Relations? 
 
There were a number of changes in international relations in the late 
1980s and the early 1990s. These changes compel one to analyze Turkish-
Iranian relations separately after 1990. In this part, these changes effecting the 
relations of the two countries will be explained by categorizing them into 
global, regional and domestic levels. 
 
1.4.1. Global Changes 
  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the bi-polar structure 
was the main change in the early 1990s in international relations. This led 
Turkish policy makers to an anxiety that the end of the bi-polar structure would 
reduce Turkey’s strategic importance to its Western allies. The Gulf War of 
1991 ended the concerns of Turkish foreign policy elite. There were now 
smaller ‘rogue states’ in the Middle East, whose policies clashed with US 
interests, and the US needed Turkey’s strategic partnership against these states. 
                                                 
41 Turkey’s exports to Iran was 11.8 million dollars in 1979, increased to 790 million dollars in 
1982 and 1.1 billion dollars in 1985. Source: Undersecretaries of Turkish Foreign Trade. 
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The US now became the sole superpower over the world, and without the 
Soviet counter balance it asserted its military supremacy in the Gulf. It began 
to pressure the ‘rogue states’. The US pressed its allies to isolate Iran and 
therefore the US pressure constrained potential Turkish-Iranian cooperation. 
 
1.4.2. Regional Changes 
 
 The end of the Iran-Iraq War led the volume of trade between Turkey 
and Iran to decrease. Iran’s imports from Turkey were mainly because of the 
necessities of war. Iran wanted to decrease its dependency on Turkey and 
directed its commercial priorities at Western Europe. Turkish construction 
firms were expected to have an important share in the construction of Iran after 
the war, but Turkish firms distrusted the Middle Eastern market because of the 
experiences of the past, when they were not paid for the job done on time, let 
alone long afterwards.43   
 
 The lack of authority in northern Iraq and the Kurdish population in 
these areas constituted a potential threat for both Iran and Turkey in terms of 
their territorial integrity and border security. Although they have common 
objectives on the problem, they mostly chose to use the Kurdish card one 
against the other, rivalry on other issues having had overtaken immediate 
concerns. 44 
 
                                                                                                                                 
42 Eralp and Tür, p.77. 
43 Eralp and Tür, p.78. 
44 Calabrese, p.5. 
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 The collapse of the Soviet Union led to the formation of newly 
independent Turkic and Muslim Republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 
These states were both an area of cooperation and rivalry for Turkey and Iran. 
The new situation looked bright for Turkey to establish economic, cultural and 
political ties with its kin, while it was an opportunity for Iran to come out of its 
isolation from the world with this new door, opened.45 
 
1.4.3. Domestic Changes 
  
 In June 1989, Iran’s supreme leader, Ayetollah Khomeini, died. Then, 
Ali Khamanei became the supreme leader and Hashemi Rafsanjani became the 
president. From then on, there was an internal debate between the radicals and 
the moderates. With Rafsanjani’s moderate and pragmatist policies, Iran 
wanted to take a more effective role in regional relations, establishing better 
ties with its neighbors. These changes improved with Mohammed Khatemi’s 
coming to power in 1997. This led to a debate on the US policy of isolating 
Iran on the one hand, and with a new regional active role of Iran, led to the 
regional rivalry between Turkey and Iran on the other.46    
 
 Simultaneously, tension between Kemalists and Islamists sharpened in 
Turkey. The rise of Islamists concerned the secularists, and the secularists 
became more sensitive towards the preservation of the secular regime. This led 
the secularists to be concerned about Turkey’s relations with Iran, which is 
                                                 
45 İhsan Çolak, “Değişen Stratejiler Işığında İran-Türk Cumhuriyetleri İlişkilerinde Yeni 
Gelişmeler,” Avrasya Dosyası 5, no.3. (1999): p.210. 
46 Eralp and Tür, p.78. 
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perceived as a potential threat to the Turkish secular regime by the secular 
Ataturkist elite of Turkey.47 
 
 Such changes in international, regional and domestic politics led to 
dynamism in Turkish-Iranian relations in the 1990s. Accordingly, there were a 
number of bilateral issues increasing the tension between the two countries. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                 
47 Calabrese, p.5. 
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CHAPTER 2
BILATERAL ISSUES
2.1. Iran’s Aim of Exporting the Islamic Regime and the Assassination Crises in
Turkey
As previously mentioned, one of the basic principles of the Iranian foreign
policy was exporting the Islamic revolution to the other Muslim countries. This was
precisely embodied in the constitution:
The Constitution, having regard to the Islamic contents of the Iranian Revolution, which
was a movement for the victory of all the oppressed over the arrogant, provides a basis
for the continuation of that revolution both inside and outside the country. It particularly
tries to do this in developing international relations with other Islamic movements and
peoples, so as to prepare the way towards a united single world community. 1
Ayetollah Khomeini, the leader of the Iranian revolution, described the
revolution as a starting point, which would spread to other Muslim countries.2
Similarly, Ayetollah Huseyin Ali Montazeri, one of the leading men of the
revolution, gave a speech in the radio in September 1979:
There is the fact that Iranian revolution can not be bounded only with the borders of
Iran. In fact, our revolution is not an Iranian revolution, but it is an Islamic revolution...
There are some expectations of the oppressed Muslim people over the world from the
Iranian people. Therefore, our revolution will reach these people. Iranian government
and people must provide all the necessary means for all these freedom wars and
Palestinian revolution.3
Revolutionaries thought that Iran was the only true Islamic government and
their aim was to create Islamic governments based on the Iranian model on other
                                                
1 Iran Constitution, p.5 ; available from http://www.aghayan.com.html; Internet; accessed 23 April
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Muslim territories. Khomeini argued that this would be in peaceful ways. However,
Iranians did not only make the propaganda of the revolution, but also trained Islamic
revolutionaries from other countries in Iran and financially supported them.  These
acts are not regarded as peaceful ways by the other Muslim countries and are
perceived as a threat to their security.
In the late 1980s and during the 1990s, all these Iranian activities coincided
with the sensitivity of Turkish secularist elite over the increasing role of religion on
public life.  In 1989, Turkish authorities found out that Iranian diplomats were
bringing literally tons of religious propaganda material in diplomatic pouches. The
Turkish Foreign Ministry put a limit of 50 kg. for all diplomatic pouches.4  Iran
opened cultural centers in Turkey, through which it made its propaganda and
indoctrination.5  Also, there were radical Islamic periodicals supporting an Iranian
kind of a state system in Turkey: Tevhid(Unity),  İstiklal-Şehadet (Independence-
Martyrdom), Söz (The Word), Dünya ve İslam (The World and Islam), Yeryüzü(The
Earth) and Davet(The Call).6 In the spring of 1992, a group of youth called
‘Revolutionary Muslim Youth’, who identified themselves with one of these
journals, Tevhid, put a banner on Istanbul University’s School of Law building to
commemorate the third anniversary of  Khomeini’s death.7
                                                                                                                                         
3 Ibid.
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What caused great reaction in Turkey against Iran were not these
propagandistic activities, but the claims about the Iranian support of terrorist
activities in Turkey to establish a base for an Islamic government in Turkey. These
claims became concrete with assassinations of Turkish journalists, academicians and
a businessman in Turkey who were in favor of Turkey’s secular structure and against
Iranian kind of a system. Two prominent Turkish academicians, Bahriye Üçok and
Muammer Aksoy, and two Turkish journalists, Çetin Emeç and Uğur Mumcu, were
assassinated in the early 1990s. Four days after Mumcu’s assassination, there was an
unsuccessful assassination attempt on Jak Kamhi, a prominent Jewish businessman
in Turkey. Especially the funeral of Uğur Mumcu, to which approximately 100 000
Turkish citizens attended, was a show of growing reaction among Turkish secularists
against Iran. The assassins to be and 19 others were arrested and they were claimed
to be the members of the radical Hezbollah organization, an Iran-related movement.8
Although the Iranian President, Hashemi Rafsanjani, denied having any relations
with the acts, firstly Turkish police reports and then Turkish Minister of Interior,
Ismet Sezgin, revealed the existence of another Islamic organization, the Islamic
Action. According to police reports, the members of the organization confessed to be
the actors of the Jak Kamhi assassination attempt and to have been trained in Iran
with the aim of creating an Islamic state in Turkey.9 On February 6,1993, Turkish
Foreign Minister, Hikmet Cetin, met his counterpart Ali Akbar Velayeti, in the
Economic Copoeration Organization (ECO) summit in Pakistan and gave him
documentary evidence of Iranian connection regarding assassinations in Turkey.10
                                                
8 Criss, p.20.
9 Turkish Probe, 9 February 1993 in Ibid., p.21
10 Ibid., p.21
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An important point needs to be mentioned here that Ankara tried to be careful
not to escalate this issue into a conflict. Semih İdiz, in Turkish Probe daily, argued
that many officials in Turkey thought that Americans could use this crisis in their
policies towards Iran, which would put Turkey under a heavy responsibility in the
region:
… there is a deliberate effort on the part of the Ankara government not to escalate this
bottleneck into crisis. According to one senior state official here, the Turks are also
wary that boosting tension could make this country instrumental in future American
plan for Iran. ‘ If we go too far,’ he says, ‘the Americans could use us as a front in their
own dispute and avoid responsibility which will end up being borne by Turkey.’ …
suspicion has started to grow against allies as much as researchers focusing on Iranian
activities. ‘ Is Turkey being used for a future conflict?’ is a key question in the minds of
many officials.11
In addition to this, Turkey wanted to establish better relations with the new
president of the Islamic Republic, who was giving signals for change in Iran. At that
time, there was an internal struggle in Iran between the new president Hashemi
Rafsanjani, who was in favor of the principle of consolidating Islam in one country
instead of instigating simultaneous revolutions in neighboring Muslim countries, and
the radicals who were insisting on supporting Islamic revolutionaries in other
countries. In such circumstances, Turkey followed a path by not increasing the
tension further, which would otherwise feed into what the radicals desired. At that
time, Turkish president, Turgut Özal, pointed the provocative incidents.12
Accordingly, Turkish Prime Minister, Süleyman Demirel, called for a coolheaded
approach to the Iranian link in the assassinations in order not to disrupt bilateral
relations unnecessarily and expressed that they did not believe that the Iranian state
was involved in the murders.13
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The Turkish security forces waged successful operations against the Islamic
terrorist organizations in 1994 and 1995, and consequently, there was a decline in
radical Islamic terrorist activities in these years. Ilim, one of Hezbollah’s two splinter
groups (Ilim and Menzil), stopped most of its armed activities, many cadres of the
Islamic Movement were arrested and IBDA-C (The Front of Islamic Great East
Warriors) retained its level of activity mostly by acts of bombing and arson.14 Then,
in March 1996, the leader of the Islamic Action, İrfan Çağırıcı, was arrested and he
revealed the Iranian connection of the organization. However, the accusations were
related mainly to the old known terrorist attacks of the 1990-93 period and did not
seriously affect bilateral relations.15
However, the relations were seriously strained at the beginning of 1997. The
Iranian ambassador in Turkey, Mohammed Bagheri, participated in Jerusalem Night
celebrations which was organized by the Sincan mayor of the pro-Islamic Welfare
Party on 31 January- 2 February 1997.  There he made a speech in which he called
for the institution of sharia in Turkey.16 This coincided with the strong anxiety of the
Turkish Armed Forces and secularist elite related to the Welfare Party’s pro-Islamic
policies and the increasing danger of reactionism in Turkey. In such circumstances,
Turkey showed a harsh reaction against this speech. The Turkish Armed Forces
paraded a convoy of tanks in Sincan as a show of force to intimidate the
reactionaries.17 This time, there was a crisis in state-to-state relations. Turkey
decided to expel ambassador Bagheri.  Tehran replied to this by expelling his
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16 Turkish Focus, March 1997, p.12 in Calabrase, p.8.
17 Eralp and Tür,  p.93.
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Turkish counterpart. In fact, Turkish secularists used this matter as a tool in their
internal struggle with reactionism.18
Not much later, Tehran tried to normalize the relations. Iranian foreign
minister, Ali Akbar Velayeti, paid a visit to Turkey. In his visit he called for the
return of the Turkish expelled ambassador. However, the Turkish president,
Süleyman Demirel, told Velayeti that Tehran’s request was not justified and
challenged the Turkish position. He added that Iranian officials must not interfere in
Turkey’s domestic affairs. Meanwhile, the Turkish Prime Minister, Necmettin
Erbakan tried to cool down the sentiments and reassured Velayeti about the bilateral
relations and guaranteed that the natural gas agreement would not be disrupted
because of this crisis.19
Then there was a period of silence, which erupted with the arrest of 92
members of the Hezbollah, a Kurdish led Islamist counter-PKK organization, by the
Turkish police on 20 October 1999. In the Turkish press, it was claimed that they
were trained in Iran.20 Only one day after these arrests, a Turkish secular-Kemalist
professor and journalist, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, was assassinated by a car bomb attack.
Then just one day after the assassination, three Iranians were detained at the Istanbul
airport while trying, it was alleged, to flee the country.21
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The assassination was immediately compared with that of Uğur Mumcu, and
the Turkish media and some politicians focused on Islamic organizations and its
Iranian connections. However, the Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, was
careful not to make any accusations regarding an Iranian connection. İlnur Cevik, the
editor of influential Turkish Daily News, related this to Turkey’s priority on its gas
project with Iran.22
Iran protested the arrests of Iranians and denied any kind of  involvement in
Kışlalı’s murder. Again, Iran related this with the US and Israel, which wanted to
raise the concern of secularists in Turkey and empower the bases of the Turkish-
Israeli cooperation.23 Olson claims that it seems unlikely that Tehran, at least by the
autumn of 1999(referring to the pipeline projects), would have much interest in the
assassination of Kışlalı.24 Tschanguiz Pahlavan, representing the Iranian view about
the issue, argues in his essay that domestic religious movements are not products of
the Iranian revolution and it would be a mistake to consider Iran the sole source of
religious movements in the region. He invites the Turkish policy makers to consider
the issue within Turkey’s socio-economic realities and suggests finding out the
causes of these acts within this framework.25
The short term relative silence ended with the beginning of 2000 by a series of
operations by the Turkish police and security forces against Hezbollah hideouts.
These operations led to the discovery of many murders by this organization. Gökhan
Aydıner, the state of emergency regional governor, and Haşim Tunç, the deputy chief
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of Gaziantep police organization, expressed their views that Hezbollah was closely
related with Iran and the members of this organization, which aims to establish an
Iranian kind of state in Turkey, were trained in Iran.26 Edip Gümüş, the Hezbollah
militant in charge of the activities in central Anatolia, revealed that large quantities
of arms were transferred from Russia to the organization’s camps in Iran and
officials of the Iranian secret service helped them to acquire funds, forged passports
and identity cards.27 The Turkish media quickly started a mass campaign against Iran
and emphasized the link of the murders of Kışlalı, Mumcu and others with the
Hezbollah organization, and the link between Hezbollah and Iran.28 Moreover, there
were claims in the media that Hezbollah worked hand in hand with the Iranian
Intelligence Service and with the embassy of Iran in Turkey. The organization was
alleged to gather intelligence information for Iran about Turkish military units in
eastern and southeastern Turkey.29
All these coincided with the visit of Iranian Foreign Minister, Kemal Kharrazi,
to Turkey. Kharrazi denied any Iranian support to the organization. He called for
cooperation to end these kinds of conflicts, pointing at the natural gas project as a
symbol of cooperation.30 Turkish high level officials were careful that time in their
speeches not to hurt bilateral relations, unlike the 1989 and 1997 crises, which led to
the expulsion of ambassadors.31
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However, the tension increased with the May 2000 operations against
Hezbollah. Turkish media, referring to sources from the Interior Ministry, claimed
that arrested militants of the organization were the murderes of 17 Turkish
journalists, professors and other well known figures. In light of the information
gathered from the Hezbollah’s study group, the Tevhid-Selam organization was
behind the assassinations. It was alleged to work hand in hand with Iran’s
Pasdaran.32 The arrested men, who defined themselves as Jerusalem Commandos,
confessed having committed the murders and revealed the connection of the
organization with the Iranian intelligence.33
The Turkish Foreign Ministry expressed its view so as not to rest the relations
unless they received adequate information proving the role of Iran in the
assassinations.34 However, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, in disagreement with the
Foreign Ministry, expressed on 17 May that Iran for years had provided shelter to
separatist terrorists and was still trying to export its revolution.35 But Ecevit tried to
adopt a conciliatory approach by drawing a distinction between the Iranian
supporters of the murderers and the Khatemi government. İlnur Çevik, editor of
Turkish Daily News, interpreted this approach to stem from Turkey’s sensitivity
about not disturbing its regional interests, especially the energy supply route issue.36
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Iranian Foreign Ministry summoned the Turkish ambassador on 21 May and
expressed dissatisfaction about the claims of Turkish media and politicians.37 Kemal
Kharrazi announced that Iran had no connection with the Hezbollah; in fact it was
the fabrication of the Turkish intelligence, and the claims about Iranian involvement
in the murders were as a part of the Zionist propaganda against Iran.38
At that time, Ahmad Behbahani, who identified himself as the head of the
security of the former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani, and the coordinator of
the terrorists activities of Iran carried on inside and outside the country, turned
himself over to the Turkish intelligence, MIT. It was claimed in the media that he
had helped Turkish security forces to arrest the murderers and would reveal to
Turkish authorities about Iranian support of terrorism.  Turkish authorities were
cautious about his explanations.39 Iran denied the allegations and claimed Behbahani
to be a member of Mujahedin- i Khalq, which is an armed opposition organization
against Iran.40 After a period of investigation about him, both the Turkish
intelligence and the American intelligence (CIA) announced that he was an
imposter.41
These circumstances led the new Turkish President, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, to
fall into a dilemma about attending the ECO summit in Tehran. After a series of
public discussions, Sezer decided not to attend. However, it was mostly a symbolic
absence. On May 2000, while the hot discussions about the assassinations continued,
Turkey signed trade agreements with Iran as a result of the visit of the Turkish
                                                
37 IRNA (Tehran), 21 May 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0521
38 Tehran Times (Tehran), 21 May 2000 in Olson, p.886.
39 Anatolia (Ankara), 5 June 2000
40 IRNA( Tehran), 11 June 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0611
30
delegation including 120 prominent Turkish businessmen. After the agreement,
Iranian Foreign Trade Minister, Raze Shafei, stated that Khatemi was not responsible
for the legacy of the past governments and called for opening a new page with
Turkey.42  Turkey attended the meeting with a group of high-ranking officials.
Interestingly and unlike the previous statements of the police, Turkish Police
Chief, Turan Genc, told on 23 May  2000 that there was yet no evidence that might
incriminate the Islamic Republic in the recent assassinations in Turkey.43 Then on 24
May 2000, captured members of the Jerusalem Warriors Organization told that
people in Iran who helped them became inactive after reformists came to power.
They added that they could not then get the financial aid, which they received
previously.44 Accordingly, the leader and bomber of the Jerusalem Warriors
informed the State Security Court in Ankara:
Our contracts were a group of revolutionary guards who were instructed by the Iranian
mullahs to cooperate with us. They were not intelligence agents. We regularly received
funds every month. However, the amount we received was reduced and then completely
cut after Mohammed Khatemi was elected president in 1999.45
Then, on 12 February 2001, Turkish Foreign Minister, İsmail Cem, said prior
to his visit to Iran that they planned to start a new dialogue process with Iran. He
added that his visit to Iran would be a beginning to improve economic relations.46
Accordingly, the steps of cooperation with Iran intensified combined with the effect
of the improvements in the gas purchase.
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One year later, Ankara State Security Court No.2 sentenced three of the
captured terrorists to death and 15 suspects to heavy imprisonment ranging from
three to 18 years.47 But there was not any reference to the Iranian connection either
in the announcement of the court or in the media.
The question naturally comes to minds why all these disputes and high tensions
took place during the 1990s, and then the tension decreased and the relations became
positive. We can determine the following points, while examining all this process:
1. There was a policy of change in Iranian foreign policy regarding the policy of
exporting the revolution. Radical policies of Khomeini softened with that of
Rafsanjani, and came to the stage of aiming at good neighborly relations with
Khatemi. The statements of the captured terrorists that help from Iran ended
with Khatemi’s government support this idea.
2. Iran misperceived the political Islam as a potential to establish an Iranian
kind of Islamic regime in Turkey.48
3. Through his tenure in 1997, Khatemi was unable to control all the military,
intelligence and judicial systems. These three institutions were largely
responsible for the acts of exporting the revolution, not the Iranian
government.49
4. Turkish secularist elite used ‘the danger of sharia coming from Iran’ rhetoric
in their fight against reactionism in Turkey. This was associated with the 28
February agenda of Turkey.
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5. With the capture of the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, and successful
operations against PKK militants, Turkey decided to finish off this PKK
problem. Accordingly, Turkey planned to cut all the aid, either logistic or
financial, or whatever else, from Iran to the PKK, by putting pressure on the
Iranian government using the assassination issues.50
6. Secular Turkey wanted to give the message to the West that Turkey played an
active role in blocking Iranian influence, through which it wanted to
empower its strategic importance for the West in the region.51
7. Turkey began to understand that there are multiple sectors of power in Iran.
The government could not control the Revolutionary Guard Army, the
intelligence and the judiciary. Given the complex structure of the Iranian
state, Turkey began to see that any Iranian connection did not necessarily
mean connection with the Iranian government. Moreover, in the struggle
between reformists and radicals in Iran, Turkey wanted to support policies of
the reformist Khatemi government by establishing good neighborly relations
with Iran.
8. The end of the days of living with the fear of reactionism in Turkey and the
new policies of Iran’s reformist government led the two states to give priority
to  economic cooperation such as energy purchase, energy transportation and
border trade. Better economic relations needed better political relations, and
the two states chose to put back the past conflictual relations. They became
sensitive in the late 1990s and in the beginning of the new century, to their
economic interests that should not be violated by these kinds of conflicts.
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2.2. The Kurdish Issue, Border Problems and the PKK
Kurds living on a very important geostrategic area between Turkey, Syria,
Iraq and Iran without a political unification created problems in the region for years.
The existence of a Kurdish minority meant potential threat for the territorial integrity
of these states. Instead of cooperating against this threat, they mostly chose to use the
Kurdish card against each other.
Related with the Turkish-Iranian relations, the Kurdish issue has been a
matter of conflict between the two states. Turkey has been seriously concerned about
its territorial integrity in the east and southeast regions of the country as a
consequence of the acts of the Kurdish rebels beginning from the establishment of
the Republic.
When PKK(Kurdish Workers Party) began its terrorist attacks in 1984 in
eastern Turkey, Turkish officials were anxious about a possible support from Iran to
Kurdish guerrillas, or at least allowing Iranian territory to be used as a staging area
for cross border attacks.52 Accordingly, Turkey signed a security agreement with Iran
on 28 October 1984. Both sides promised to prohibit any kind of action on its
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territory against the security of the other.53 Iran was mostly loyal to the agreement
and there were no PKK attacks to Turkey from the Iranian border except a few.54
During the Iran-Iraqi War of 1981-1988, Iran collaborated with and equipped the
Iraqi Kurds against the Iraqi army.55 Iran was trying to promote the Islamic
movement among all Kurds. But it was unlikely to be well accepted in Marxist-
Leninist PKK.
The Turkish Foreign Ministry announced in July 1992 that they agreed with
Iran to cooperate against PKK. The Border Security Committee was reactivated at
that time. In October 1993, they signed a joint security protocol, according to which
none of the states would allow a terrorist organization to exist on its soil.56 However,
these efforts remained a symbol of goodwill between the two states.57
PKK intensified its terrorist activities against Turkey in 1994 and the
mountainous Iranian border offered a safe haven to PKK terrorists.58 Turkey called
on Iran not to allow PKK members to locate in Iranian territory. Iran rejected the
claims for its support to PKK. Iran invited Turkey to control the Iranian side of the
border and called Turkey to protect its own borders, since they were suitable enough
for PKK terrorists to stay and hide.59
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Tension increased with the statements of the officers of the Turkish army. On
November 1996, Turkey’s 5th Border Region’s Regiment Commander, Colonel
Ismail Pekin, announced that there were large number of PKK training camps both in
Armenia and Iran.60 In the beginning of July 1996, five Turkish soldiers were killed
in a PKK attack coming from the Iranian side of the border. Turkey warned the
Iranian deputy foreign minister, who was visiting Turkey at that time, about the
border security and PKK.61
On 17 September 1996, a Common Security Committee met in Ankara and
the Turkish delegation submitted a report including detailed information about PKK
camps in Iran.62 There were also hot discussions within Turkey, since the pro-Islamic
Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, did not present a clear attitude towards Iran.
This angered not only secularists but also most of the public opinion, which was
extremely sensitive on the PKK issue.
The Chief of General Staff transmitted their anxiety about the PKK threat
from Iran directly to the Presidency. In a report given to the Parliament’s Border
Security Investigation Committee, it was proved with documentary evidence that
Iran gave access to the PKK and the PKK members traveled freely bearing weapons
in Iran.63 In his visit to Tehran in March 1997, Iran’s Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar
Velayeti, called Turkey to end this crisis, however President Demirel and Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Tansu Çiller, did not welcome his request.
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They warned Iran not interfere in Turkish internal affairs.64 Prime Minister Erbakan
apologized to Velayeti, but this was not enough to decrease the tension.
On 29 February 1997, a Turkish general, Kenan Deniz, claimed that Iran was
giving logistical support to the PKK and there were currently 500 to 600 PKK
members on Iranian territory.65 On May 1997, Turkey launched a cross border
operation in northern Iraq against the PKK. Before starting the operation, Turkey
informed Iran and wanted Iran to control its borders not to allow PKK terrorists to
escape there. However, Iranian authorities did not take this request into consideration
and 700 militants escaped to Iran from Turkish forces. Moreover, there were Iranian
made weapons captured in PKK camps during the operation.66
At that time, Iran sent its Deputy Foreign Minister, Brucerdi, to Turkey.
Brucerdi faced strong reaction from Turkish authorities and he was given many
documents proving Iran-PKK relations. Brucerdi’s statements that Iran was not
helping PKK and that Iran ordered its soldiers to kill PKK terrorists did not decrease
the tension. Then, on 18 June 1997, Iranian President, Rafsanjani, came to Turkey
and assured Turkey that Iran would not give any kind of support to PKK.
Meanwhile, the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, said in a speech to BBC that Iran
took an adverse attitude towards PKK and would hand over some PKK militants to
Turkey.67  These two events decreased the tension to a certain extent.
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During 1998, Turkey continued to put pressure on Iran to cut off any kind of
support to the PKK. Turkish authorities decided to terminate PKK by using all
diplomatic and military means. The deputy Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, claimed
on 29 September 1998 that Iran provoked the separatist PKK organization against
Turkey and he gave the list of 16 PKK camps on the Iranian side of the border.68
However, he was cautious not to directly target the government of Iran and said that
there were forces in Iran which President Mohammed Khatemi could not control.69
It is important for Turkey to realize the plurality of power in the Islamic Republic of
Iran and to be sensitive not to hurt state to state relations. Meanwhile, Turkey
focused on Öcalan’s capture and put a heavy pressure on Syria to extradite him to
Turkey. Meanwhile, Turkey wanted to take Iran on its side, by explaining its
sensitivity on the PKK issue and by giving evidence of Syria-PKK link to Iranian
Foreign Minister, Kemal Kharrazi.70
However, after Turkey’s success with its pressure on Syria, there were
allegations that the PKK infiltrated to Iran after being expelled from Syria.71
Meanwhile, Şemdin Sakık, one of the leaders of the PKK captured by Turkish forces,
stated that Iran permitted armed militants of the PKK to establish camps on the
border of Iran with Turkey in order to have its own borders protected. He added that
the most important aim of Iran by giving support to the PKK was to weaken the
Turkish state and establish an Islamic order in Turkey.72 Then on November 1998,
there were reports claiming that Osman Öcalan, the brother of Abdullah Öcalan, and
the second man in the organization, escaped to Iran together with many terrorists
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who also managed to escape from Turkey’s operation launched in northern Iraq
against the PKK.73
With the capture of the leader of PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey wanted to
fully destroy the organization. Accordingly, Turkish politicians increased their
pressure on Iran. The new Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, accused Iran of
continuing its efforts to export its revolution and of supporting the PKK, in spite of
the border agreements signed. He charged Iran of taking over Syria’s role as the main
supporter of the PKK. He noted that Iran hosted the 6th annual congress of the
PKK.74 The two countries’ TV and radio media engaged in a war of bombast for the
next two weeks. The Turkish media showed PKK terrorists confessing to have been
trained in Iran.75
Meanwhile, Iran intensified its claims that the Turkish armed forces violated
the borders. This was not a new claim. After Saddam Hüseyin’s loss of control in
northern Iraq, there was lack of authority and this created an opportunity to use the
region as a safe haven. Therefore, Turkey launched cross-border operations which
disturbed Iran who alleged that Turkey violated the Iranian border. For example, Iran
claimed on September 1996 that two Turkish helicopters crossed the Iranian border
and launched a rocket attack, which resulted in the death of six Iranian citizens.76
This time, Iran’s pressure was heavier than before. Iran alleged that Turkish aircraft
bombed sites on Iranian territory and killed five Iranian people. The bombing raid
was alleged to have taken place near Piranshahr, a city about 40 miles south of the
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triangle where the borders of Iran, Turkey and Iraq meet.77 Iranian Foreign Ministry
officials stated that they reserved the right to retaliate and added that they would not
return two captured Turkish soldiers until Turkey paid compensation. Denying the
Iranian claims, Turkish National Defense Minister, Sebahattin Çakmakoglu, said that
it was out of the question for Turkish aircraft to cross the Iranian border and hit
certain targets.78 This heavy pressure of Iran coincided with the July 1999
demonstrations in Iran. It is not surprising that Tehran wanted to use this issue for its
domestic political legitimacy.79
The Foreign Ministry officials of the two countries started a dialogue to solve
the problem. As a result of the discussions, Iran returned the two Turkish soldiers it
was holding since 22 July to the Turkish authorities.80 Turkish Foreign Ministry
announced on 6 October 1999 that the investigation delegation reported that Turkish
aircraft did not bomb Iranian territory; instead the bombed area was in northern Iraq.
The report argued that certain persons living in this area who have Iranian citizenship
might have incurred damages. Additionally, Turkey decided to contribute to the
compensation of the damage caused.81 Then Foreign Ministry officials of the two
countries focused on setting up security committees. The meetings of high and sub
security committees were regulated and they began to meet periodically to solve the
disputes on the basis of direct dialogue and cooperation.82 A memorandum of
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understanding on security and border issues was to be signed between the two states
on October 2001.83
Coming back to the PKK issue, Turkey continued its pressure on Iran at the
beginning of 2000, which was supported by the Hezbollah operations and Turkish
claims of Iran’s support of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey. As previously
mentioned, Turkey used the issue of ‘Iranian support for Islamic movements in
Turkey’ as a card to completely end Iran’s support to the PKK. Turkish media
expressed reports claiming that suicide bombers of the PKK were being trained in
Iran and weapons of the organization were transferred from Iran to northern Iraq.84
Turkey asked Iran to take more measures against the PKK.85
In August 2000, Khatemi sent a message to his counterpart Sezer, expressing
that every effort would be made to solve the security problems between the two
countries.86 Turkey once again sent a file including documentary evidence that
showed Iranian support for the PKK and Hezbollah.87 During İsmail Cem’s visit to
Iran on February 2001, the sides reached a consensus on cooperation against the
PKK and Hezbollah. Kharrazi assured Cem that foreign elements in Iran, which
might make Turkey uneasy, would be expelled and none would be allowed to operate
against Turkey in Iran.88 Finally, on October 2001, Muzaffer Ecemis, Interior
Ministry Undersecretary of Turkey, stated at the end of the Eight Meeting of the
Higher Security Commission that there was not any border conflict or territorial
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dispute between Turkey and Iran. He mentioned mutual help in their fight against
terrorism, referring to the Mujaheddin-i Khalq, which is the strongest opposition
armed organization against Iran.89
2.3. Iranian Regime Opponents in Turkey
Mujaheddin-I Khalq Organization (MKO) has been the strongest opposition
movement against the Islamic regime in Iran. Iran accused this organization of armed
activities, which resulted in various bombings, and of assassinating Iranian
politicians. The Iranian authorities constantly registered complaints about the
presence of the militants of this organization among the Iranian refugees in Turkey.
The Iranian refugees in Turkey, who are anywhere between 500 000 to 1
million changing according to different sources,90 mostly escaped from Iran after the
revolution of 1979. Iran charged Turkish authorities of not taking necessary
measures against the MKO militants among the refugees.
On the other side, there are allegations that Iran sent some total of 10 000
agents to Turkey at different times in order to contain and intimidate the Iranians in
Turkey.91 Over the past two decades, more than 200 Iranian dissidents were killed in
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Turkey.92 More dramatically, it was alleged that Iran provided its agents diplomatic
passports to fight against the MKO militants in Turkey. In October 1988, four Iranian
diplomats were caught while attempting to kidnap an Iranian refugee in the trunk of a
car, which resulted in a diplomatic scandal. Turkey refused to return the kidnappers
who were sentenced to two years in prison. The tension increased with the mutual
expulsion of some diplomats.93
On June 1994, Turkish security forces captured 16 MKO members and
refused their request of political asylum.94 Turkish officials expressed their
decisiveness not to allow any organization working against its neighbors within its
territories, while expecting the same from its neighbors. However, Tehran alleged
again that Turkey allowed the MKO rally on its. Iranian News Agency (IRNA)
reported that it was the first time Ankara had authorized an anti-Iranian
demonstration. Tehran summoned the Turkish ambassador to its Foreign Ministry
and warned about the affair.95 There were not any significant problems related with
that matter after this. But each time Turkey held up the issue of the PKK problem,
Iran raised the issue of the MKO and wanted Turkey to take necessary measures
against the organization.
Through the 1990s, Turkey condoned the existence of the Iranian agents and
the Turkish security forces hardly investigated the murders of Iranian refugees.
Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent journalist in Turkey, suggested that requirement of
visas for Iranians would be a sufficient way to control the agent traffic between Iran
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and Turkey. However, he argued that Iran would retaliate by requiring visas for
Turks, which would result in impeding Turkish and international truck transport via
Iran to the Gulf countries.96 Another argument was that Turkey hoped for less Iranian
support for the PKK in return.97
One way or another, Turkey and Iran seem nowadays to agree on cooperation
against terrorism. At the end of the Eight Meeting of the Higher Security
Commission, the sides signed a memorandum of understanding. Turkish
representative, Muzaffer Ecemiş, presented this cooperation in his speech in the
meeting: “While PKK has been staging terrorist actions against Turkey’s public
order. MKO has been staging terrorist actions against Iran’s public order.
Cooperation on fight against these organizations will continue with determination.”98
    
Such dynamic nature of relations was not bound only with bilateral relations.
Developments in the regional context in the 1990s such as the formation of the newly
independent states in the Caucasus and the Central Asia, Turkish-Israeli cooperation
and Iran’s armament policies effected the course of the relations.
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CHAPTER 3 
REGIONAL ISSUES 
 
3.1. Turkish-Iranian Rivalry and Cooperation in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia 
 
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the formation of the newly 
independent states (NIS) in the Caucasus and the Central Asia created an area 
of both rivalry and cooperation between Iran and Turkey, both of which had 
territorial, historical, cultural and economic links with these states. Turkey 
perceived this situation as an opportunity to reestablish its brotherhood links 
with the new Turkic republics, which would bring political, cultural and 
economic cooperation. Turkish policy towards the NIS in the early 1990s was 
called Pan-Turkist. On the other hand, Iran emphasized shared religious beliefs, 
which led its policy to be called as Pan-Islamist. Iran perceived the new 
situation as an opportunity to leave its isolation from the international arena by 
using these states as a corridor to open to the world political and economic 
markets. 
 
Both Iran and Turkey portrayed their policies towards the region as 
complementary and non-threatening. Nevertheless, none of them was 
convinced by one another’s claim of peaceful intentions and modest regional 
objectives. 1  Both of them were the founding members of Economic 
Cooperation Organization (ECO) and offered cooperation around this 
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organization. However, even in the ECO summit of 1992 in Tehran, they went 
their separate ways. Tehran announced the formation of Caspian Sea Littoral 
Zone and Turkey responded with the formation of the Black Sea Economic 
Cooperation Council.2  
 
Iranian primary advantage was its geopolitics, which provided a route 
for these republics to open to the world markets through Iran. Iranian president 
Rafsanjani mentioned this in a speech in 1992, calling to the leaders of the new 
republics: “Cooperation should certainly be carried out via Iran. For links 
between the North and the South, the east and the west, these countries and 
Europe, Europe and Asia, everything should cross Iran-oil and gas pipelines, 
railways, communication routes and international airports.’ 3 
 
However, US opposition, the failure of the pan-Islamic approach and 
the weak Iranian businessmen constituted disadvantages for Iran. Firstly, the 
US perceived an influential Iran in the region as a threat to its interests. This 
constituted the primary disadvantage of Iran in the competition in the region. 
On the other hand, the US supported secular and democratic Turkey in this 
rivalry. 4  Secondly, Iranian pan-Islamist policy was not welcomed in these 
countries. The city people who were highly educated and had the influences of 
Soviet atheism were not sensitive to Islamic values. Additionally, the Hanefi 
sect of Islam was widespread in these republics (except Azerbaijan), therefore 
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3, no.3. (1996): p.172.  
3  Dietl, p.18. 
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Shia version of Iranian Islam could not find a base to expand in these 
countries.5 Criticizing Iranian foreign policy towards the NIS in the early 1990s, 
Dr. Hermidas Bavand, an Iranian political analyst stated in the Tel Hayat-e 
Now daily : ` Instead of supplying the Central Asian states with the things they 
really wanted, Iran began to provide them with doctrinaire value-based 
commodities,  and this process created a negative perception in these 
countries.”6 On November 1992, Uzbek President, İslam Kerimov, called the 
leaders of the NIS to defend themselves against a pan-Islamic attempt from the 
south. 7  With the lessons of these experiences, and leaving aside Islamic 
approaches, Iran began to identify itself as a party to the economic rivalry in 
the region. Moreover, Iran supported the existing governments in the conflicts 
between the governments and the Islamic opponent forces.8Thirdly, Iranian 
businessmen could not succeed as actors in the economic rivalry. They were 
not supported enough by the Iranian government. The Iranian financial system, 
which was not in accordance with the international norms, created an obstacle 
for the Iranian businessmen. Additionally, Iranian industry was far from high 
technology, which fell short of satisfying the needs of these states.9  
 
Besides the opportunities, the new situation in the former Soviet south 
created some dangers for Iran. On the international level, Iran feared that the 
US would fill the power gap in the region after Soviet domination. On the 
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regional level, Iran was anxious about inter ethnic violence which could 
damage regional stability. Furthermore, Iran perceived  the national sentiment 
among the Turkic peoples of the NIS as a potential threat to its internal stability 
and territorial integrity. 10  This was the point, which made the perceived 
Turkish pan-Turkist policies as violating Iran’s interests. Turkish policies 
overlapped with Azerbaijan’s president Abulfalz Elchibey’s pro-Turkish 
policies.11 In fact, the Azeri population located in the north of Iran was the 
other source of Iranian anxiety. Elchibey’s irredentist approaches pronouncing 
the unification of Azeris of Azerbaijan with Azeris of Iran intensified Iran’s 
anxiety. The new president Heidar Aliev followed more realistic and balanced 
policies towards Turkey and Iran considering his country’s economic benefits 
as a priority. But he was concerned about Islamic radicalism like Uzbekistan 
and the other Central Asian Republics, where there is a general view that Iran 
is behind such movements. 12  Simultaneously, Turkey tuned down its pan-
Turkist rhetoric, which after all had been geared towards domestic 
consumption verbalized by certain politicians. All these developments 
lightened Iran’s anxiety over its Azeri population. 
 
Not its pan-Turkist approach of the early 1990s, but its secular and 
westernized identity made Turkey more attractive for the NIS as a model. 
Turkey was the first country to recognize the independence of these states. 
Turkey wanted to export its experience of democracy and market economy to 
these states. Instead of Iranian alternatives, the NIS preferred the Turkish 
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religious guidance to teach Islam to their citizens and adopted the Latin 
alphabet.13  The new situation was an opportunity for Turkish economy to enter 
new markets. Also, the oil and gas reserves of the region would decrease 
Turkey’s dependency on the Middle Eastern oil and gas.14 On the other hand, 
these countries wanted to free themselves from Russian dependence. 
Accordingly, Turkey gave them credits between 1992 and 1994 when they 
were in crisis. Also, Turkish companies were successful in their investments in 
the NIS.15 All these led Turkey and the NIS to get closer in the fist half of the 
1990s. However, the Turkish economy could not meet the expectations of these 
countries in the following years to open to the world. Simultaneously, Russia 
got more actively involved in the rivalry and had the lion’s share of the 
economic relationship with the NIS.16 As a result, Turkish influence decreased 
in the mid 1990s. 
 
The issues of the sales and transportation of the mineral resources of the 
region dominated the following years. Rich oil and gas reserves lie under the 
Caspian Sea, mostly oil in Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and gas in 
Turkmenistan. The proven reserves are 16 billion barrels of oil and 8.3 billion 
cubic meters of gas, and the possible reserves are much greater: 163 billion 
barrels of oil and 17.6 billion cubic meters of gas.17   
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There are some motivations in Turkey and Iran to take part in Caspian 
mineral resources competition. On the Turkish side, its growing energy needs 
created a problem for Turkish decision makers and Turkey wanted to solve this 
problem mainly by natural gas purchases.18  Accordingly, Turkey wanted to 
end its dependency on certain countries and to diversify its suppliers of natural 
gas mainly with purchases from new suppliers, Turkmenistan and Iran. 
Secondly, Turkey wanted to lessen the dependence of the NIS on Russia. Thus, 
Turkey was against the Russian proposal to  transport  the mineral resources, 
which would increase the Russian domination in the region.19 On the Iranian 
side, Iran wanted to avoid substantial Turkish and western presence in the 
Caspian, and accordingly offered various cooperation schemes to Kazakhstan, 
Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to jointly extract and export their oil and gas.20 
Iran was the most attractive route regarding its geographically advantageous 
situation, which connects the Caspian basin to Persian Gulf and then to the 
world markets.21  
 
The signature of a $ 8 billion production sharing deal with the 
Azerbaijani state oil company SOCAR on 20 September 1994, by a consortium 
of oil companies, led by the British Petroleum Company (BP), 22  attracted 
attention to the region. According to the contract, Iran was isolated from the 
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project. Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan were not good during President 
Abulfalz Elchibey’s tenure. But the new President, Heidar Aliev, stated after he 
came to power, that they wanted to have mutually beneficial relations with Iran 
in the fields of oil production and marketing. Accordingly, Aliev transferred 
5% out of SOCAR’s 20% share to Iran. However, because of the objections of 
the US administration, the consortium turned down this transfer. 23  This 
attracted the reaction of Iran and thus, Iran declared that it was then on the 
Russian side regarding the illegality of the Azeri oil project, referring to the 
problem of the legal status of the Caspian Sea.  24 
 
The US objection isolated Iran from big projects of oil extraction and 
transportation of mineral resources. However, Iran succeeded with its ‘swap 
formula’.  Iran’s oil fields are located in the southwest of the country and along 
the Gulf coast, whereas the main refining centers are in the north in Tabriz, 
Tehran and Arak. Additionally, the domestic market for oil is mostly in the 
north since urban centers and industrial areas are around the Caspian rim. Iran 
and Kazakhstan signed and agreement in 1997, under which the latter would 
sell 2 million tons of oil to Iran annually, which would be consumed in the 
north of the country. In return, Iran would sell an equal amount of oil from its 
production in the south to the buyers of Kazakhi oil.25  Tehran also ended up a 
natural gas swap agreement on August 1996. Accordingly, a 40 inch gas 
pipeline would be built from the onshore Turkmen gas field of Korpoje to 
north Iran and the initial annual capacity would be 2 billion cubic meters, but 
                                                                                                                                 
(8.5%), Japanese Itochu (7.45%), the British Ramco (2%), Turkey’s TPAO (6.75%), Saudi 
Arabia’s Delta (1.6%) and Azerbaijan’s SOCAR (10%). See Bölükbaşı, p.2. 
23 Bölükbaşı, p.3 
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would rise to 8-9 billion cubic meters depending on consumption in northern 
Iran.26  Iran would no longer need to ship its own natural gas from the south to 
the north of the country. Tehran’s second success was the opening of the 
Mashad-Saraks-Tejen railway on May 1996, which links Iran with 
Turkmenistan. Iranian President Rafsanjani named it ‘The Silk Road Railway’ 
and it linked Iran not only with Turkmenistan but with all the Central Asian 
NIS.27 Turkey linked its domestic network by constructing a 100 kilometer 
long railway in order to have a railway link with the Central Asian markets.28 
On the other hand, Iran was happy with the Turkish link, since it served Iran’s 
position to be the sole non-CIS window of Central Asia to the rest of the world. 
 
What Iran wanted enthusiastically to do through cooperation with 
Turkey was to sell its gas and to transport Turkmen gas over Iran and Turkey 
to the European markets. In 1994, former US Secretary of State, Alexander 
Haig, brought his own US-CIS Ventures and Wavemeg Companies together 
with Turkey, Iran, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Russia in an international 
council. His project foresaw a 3500 km. export pipeline for Turkmen gas 
through Iran and Turkey with the aim of reaching European markets. The 
initial throughput would be around 2 billion cubic meters and would reach  28 
billion cubic meters by 2020.29  
 
The future looked  bright for Turkey and Iran. However, the project was 
opposed by the US administration because of Iran’s participation. Despite the 
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US objection, Turkey and Iran insisted on finding out ways to cooperate on this 
project. Turkey signed an agreement in 1996 with Iran to buy Iranian gas. The 
US called on Turkey to drop the deal to buy gas from Iran and instead take gas 
from Central Asia via an alternative route. The US argued that Turkish-Iranian 
deal was contradictory to the D’Amato Act of the US in 1996, which forbade 
investments more than 40 million dollars in Iran.30 On May 1997, Turkey 
concluded an agreement with Turkmenistan, under which 3 billion cubic 
meters of gas would be brought to Turkey.31 On May 1997, Turkmenistan 
proposed the Turkmenistan, Iran, Turkey, Europe project in the ECO summit, 
which envisaged a 2 177 km. long gas pipeline with an annual capacity of up to 
30 billion cubic meters of gas.32 Then on July 1997, it was announced that the 
US partially lifted the embargo and decided not to hinder the project.33 The 
sides intensified talks on the project. On 13 August 1997, Turkmen President, 
Saparmurad Turkmenbasi, announced that the time and term for the beginning 
of the construction of the Turkmenistan- Iran- Turkey-Europe gas pipeline 
would be decided within a few days.34 On December 1997, the sides signed an 
agreement on the construction of the pipeline.35  However, things did not go 
well further. Again the US factor came on the scene. On December 1998, 
Turkmenbasi took the US administration’s backed side and the Eurasian 
corridor for the pipeline route.36 Reports claimed that the US administration did 
not want Iran to be influential in energy lines as it considers Iran as a rouge 
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state.37 This increased the antagonism of Iranians towards the US. Iranians 
criticized the US of ignoring economic feasibility. 38  As a result, Turkish-
Iranian cooperation remained bound only with Turkish purchase of Iranian gas 
and could not expand to  larger projects. 
 
 
 3.2. The Effects of Turkish-Israeli Military Cooperation   
 
Turkey followed a balanced policy towards its relations with the Middle 
Eastern countries during the Cold War period. Regarding the Palestinian issue, 
Turkish foreign policy was mostly in accordance with the Arab view, but it was 
also careful to respect the Israeli state, which was a party to the Western 
alliance in the region. With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 
Oslo peace process, Turkey began to normalize and improve its relations with 
Israel. On 31 December 1991, bilateral relations increased to the ambassadorial 
level.39 Turkey made the first official visit on June 1992 by Turkish Tourism 
Minister,Abdulkadir Ates, then on October 1992 by Turkish Foreign Minister, 
Hikmet Cetin. 40   On these visits, Turkey focused on improving economic 
relations. Israel reciprocated to these with the visit of President Ezer Weizmann 
on January 1994.41 
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 The turning point in the context of the relations was on October 1994, 
with the visit of Turkish Prime Minister, Tansu Ciller. In this visit, relations 
extended to security matters. Turkey signed an agreement on a modernization 
project of Turkish Air Force and offered further cooperation against terrorism 
and on intelligence. Accordingly, the sides signed the Military Training 
Cooperation Agreement on February 1996, and the Defense Cooperation 
Agreement on August 1996.42 
 
The security perceptions of Turkey were the main factors, which led to 
cooperate with Israel. Turkey perceived the Middle Eastern countries as a 
threat to its territorial integrity and secular regime regarding their support to the 
PKK and the expansion of radical Islam in Turkey. The lack of authority in 
northern Iraq and the potential threats from Syria and Iran, and the permission 
of Syria for Greece to use its air space in a war with Turkey, caused anxiety in 
Turkey. In the calculation of these security perceptions and the decision to 
cooperate with Israel, the military was the leading institution in Turkey.43 
While Turkish security calculations were mostly directed towards Syria, Israeli 
security perceptions aimed at Iran.44 Claims that Iran was producing weapons 
of mass destruction and Iranian support of Islamic movements among 
Palestinian groups were the main sources of the Israeli anxiety.45 
 
Turkey declared officially many times that this cooperation did not 
target any third party. However, this cooperation was perceived as a threat by 
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Iran and Syria to their security. 46  It was also criticized in Turkey that it 
produced a new threat by increasing its neighbors’ insecurity and that it 
narrowed its space of maneuver in its political relations in the Middle 
East47.Regarding Turkish-Iranian relations, Turkish-Israeli cooperation brought 
negative effects. The Islamic Republic of Iran has always perceived Israel as a 
threat to the Islamic world in general and to the Islamic Republic in particular. 
The Iranian ruling elite claim that Israel, with its Zionist policies, aims to 
weaken the Muslim countries. Iranians call on the Muslim world to cooperate 
against the Zionist aims of Israel.48 Despite the changes in Iranian foreign 
policy with Khatemi, there is not any signal of softening towards Israel. Within 
such an Iranian perception of Israel, Turkish-Israeli cooperation attracted 
reaction in Iran. What disturbed Iran regarding the cooperation agreement were 
mainly the training flights of the Israeli pilots in the southeastern region of 
Turkey, and intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Israel. Iran perceived 
this as a threat to its border security, claiming that the Israelis would secretly 
observe the Iranian territory.49 Turkish Foreign Ministry officials announced on 
September 1998, as they did several times previously, that developing Turkish 
Israeli relations was not directed against any country in the region.50 Then on 
June 1999, Turkish Foreign Minister, Hikmet Çetin, announced that the 
agreements did not mean a military pact, instead they were about technical 
                                                                                                                                 
45 Ibid, p.205. 
46 AFP (Paris), 16 June 1996 in FBIS-NES-96-117 
47 Ahmet Davutoğlu, Stratejik Derinlik (Istanbul: Küre yayinlari,2001), p.422 and Altunışık, 
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September 1994 in FBIS-NES-94-174 
49 Aras, p.203. 
50 Anatolia (Ankara), 9 September 1998 in FBIS-WEU-98-252 
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cooperation issues.51 However, these announcements did not satisfy either Iran 
or other neighbors of Turkey.  
 
An Iranian journalist commented on the agreement that it had a 
considerable negative effect on the relations of Turkey with its neighbors and 
other Muslim countries. He also expressed growing anxiety that Israel could 
use this connection to expand its influence on the Caucasus and Central Asia.52 
Iranian media alleged that Israel prevented the improvement of Turkish-Iranian 
relations. They claimed that the sources of charges in Turkey about the so-
called support of Iran to the PKK and the delay of the purchase of Iranian gas 
by Turkey were Israeli related.53 Iranian Foreign Minister, Kemal Kharrazi, 
expressed Iranian concern about Israeli presence in Turkey to his counterpart 
Ismail Cem in his visit to Turkey on January 2000.54  The claims in Iranian 
media continued on May 2000 that anti-Iranian campaign in Turkey, regarding 
the Iranian connection in the assassinations and the Hezbollah55, was planned 
and supported by Israel in order to prevent new Iranian foreign policy aimed at 
establishing better relations with its neighbors. The reports claimed that Israel 
wanted to create a new regional crisis and to prevent reactions against its 
military campaign towards the new intifadah of the Palestinians.56  
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The concerns of Iran intensified with the fist joint maneuvers by Turkey, 
Israel and the US in June 2001. Iranian reports argued that Israeli intelligence 
agents and military advisors were collecting information about Turkey’s 
neighbors by using airspace and territorial waters of Turkey. Iranians claimed 
that Turkey was being used for the expansionist policies of Israel and added 
that this would have negative consequences for Turkey’s security as well.57 
 
It is obvious that Turkish-Israeli cooperation created new problems for 
Turkey. Iran knows that this cooperation is not an alliance or a pact. But its 
anxiety is about Israeli presence on the Turkish border with Iran and its 
intelligence activities. Turkish officials’ announcements that this cooperation 
did not aim at any third party are not enough to end Iranian concerns. Turkey 
should show some concrete signs about the context of the agreements and the 
joint maneuvers to alleviate Iranian concerns. Otherwise, it would remain as a 
problem in the minds of Iranian decision-makers regarding their relations with 
Turkey.  
 
3.3. Iran’s Armament Program: Missiles and Nuclear Weaponization 
 
Iran’s international isolation after the 1979 revolution led it to have 
much difficulty in replacing its military losses during the Iran- Iraq war. In 
order not to live the same difficulties again, Iran sought to develop its own 
military industries and to reduce its dependency on foreign arms suppliers.58  
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The desire of Iranians and the Iranian state to become a regional power on the 
one hand, and perception of threats from Iraq, the Soviet Union and then 
Turkey, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan,59  led Iranian defense policy makers to 
follow a policy of building a strong military. Regarding Turkish- Iranian 
relations, Turkish military cooperation with Israel, which provided Israel to 
have an effective presence on the Turkish border with Iran, increased the 
Iranian perception of threat from the Turkish border.  
 
According to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, the Supreme 
Leader, Ali Khamenei is commander-in chief of the armed forces, which 
consists of three main components:60 1. The regular military 2.The Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Forces (IRGC)  3. The Law Enforcement Forces (LEF). 
(See article 110 of the Iran Constitution)61. There are differences between the 
approaches of the regular military and the IRGC towards the military program.  
The regular military had a traditional approach to war, with a balanced 
emphasis on hardware, technology and the human element. By contrast, the 
IRGC emphasized the human factor and the missile forces and non- 
conventional weapons programs.62  
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61 Iran Constitution, p.30; available from http://www.aghayan.com.html; Internet; accessed 23 
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On the other hand, Iran’s conventional military capabilities are 
relatively limited. Iran suffered from a decade of war and revolution, and two 
decades of financial hardship. Despite its significant amount of purchases of 
conventional weapons63, its conventional capability is relatively weak, taken 
into consideration the size of the country and the magnitude of its security 
problems, compared with the capacity of its neighbors.64 Given its financial 
problems, non- conventional weaponization, especially nuclear armament, 
seems the attractive way for Iran to become a military power without 
destroying its economy.65  
 
On August 1992, Iran agreed with Russia to finish the Bushehr power 
plant, which had started in 1975, but was halted by the 1979 revolution and on 
June 1995 the sides again agreed to install one VVER-1000 reactor in 
Bushehr66. Uncontrolled nuclear materials and personnel donated with nuclear 
weaponization know- how after the disintegration of the USSR, intensified the 
doubts. Despite the announcement of both sides that this program aimed at 
civilian purposes and Iran was a party of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), there 
grew great anxiety among the US and its allies in the region, including Turkey, 
that Iran might go nuclear. The dual-use of nuclear technology, which can be 
converted easily from civilian to military purposes, increased the anxieties. 
After the disastrous experiences with Iraq, it was understood that IAEA 
                                                 
63 Ibid, p.8. 
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World Almanac and Book of Facts (1995), p.215, 1.chart 
65 Eisenstadt 2, p.3. 
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inspectors can be deceived because of the dual use of the nuclear technology.67 
Therefore, the two new provisions of the IAEA protocol known as Program 
3+2 were designed to close this loophole. However, Iran refused to ratify these 
new provisions.68 This increases  concerns about Iranian nuclear program. 
 
CIA director, James Woolsey warned on September 1994 that Iran 
might create a nuclear weapon of its own within the following eight to ten 
years.69 What increased the anxiety in Turkey was the missile program of Iran. 
The backbone of Iran’s strategic missile forces consists of 300 Shahab-1 (with 
a range of 320 km) and 100 Shahab-2 missiles (with a range of 500 km). Iran 
conducted the tests of Shahab-3 missiles (with a range of 1300 km), and 
claimed to develop Shahab-4 (with an estimated range of 2000 km) and draw 
up plans for a Shahab-5 missile (with an expected range of 5000 to 10000 
km).70  Iran’s missiles can reach major population centers in Turkey, Israel, 
Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Gulf States. These missiles can be used 
with chemical, biological and nuclear warheads and this poses a strong threat 
to Iran’s neighbors, including Turkey. Iranian officials announced that these 
entire armament programs were for defense and would never have any 
aggressive intentions.71  
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Despite the US opposition and the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions 
of Act of 1998, Russia insists on continuing its help to Iran in terms of 
conventional and nuclear sales.72  Turkish officials announced their worries 
about Iran’s missile and nuclear programs. For example, Turkish Foreign 
Ministry stated on July 1998 that they were closely monitoring the Iranian 
missile programs.73 This issue did not reach a level of crisis between the two 
countries and is not Turkey’s number one foreign policy priority yet. But it 
remains as a potential source of instability in the region and the bilateral 
relations of the two countries.        
 
As a result, we see that the relations went on an uncertain ground. Ups 
and downs in bilateral and regional relations did not allow a stable ground on 
which better economic ties and cooperation would be established. Turkey’s 
purchase of Iranian gas was the only significant development in economic 
relations. However, the development process of this agreement shows that 
other political matters seriously effected the operation of the agreement. 
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CHAPTER 4
ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Commerce between Turkey and Iran had flourished during the Iran-Iraq
War (1981-1988) as a result of high amount of increase in Turkish exports to
Iran. Although contracts for merchandise trade were signed in the early 1990s,
these could not be put into practice because of the accumulation of large debts
by Iran to Turkish businesses and imposition of strict curbs on imports by Iran
to conserve foreign exchange.1
Years Exports
% in
T.T.E. Imports
% in
T.T.I. Difference
% in
I.T.E.
% in
I.T.I.
1989 561 4, 82 233 1, 47 328
1990 495 3, 81 492 2, 20 3
1991 487 3, 58 91 0, 43 396
1992 455 3, 09 365 1, 59 90
1993 290 1, 88 367 1, 24 -377
1994 250 1, 38 692 2, 97 -442 3, 56 1, 81
1995 268 1, 23 689 1, 92 -421 3, 75 1, 93
1996 297 1, 27 806 1, 84 -509 3, 59 1, 82
1997 307 1, 16 646 1, 33 -339 3, 51 2, 16
1998 195 0, 72 433 0, 94 -238 3, 30 1, 36
1999 158 0, 59 635 1, 56 -477 3, 01 1, 24
2000 236 0, 84 816 1, 49 -580 2, 87 1, 65
2001 235 0, 78 880 1, 86 -655 3, 41 1, 33
In million dollars)
∗Turkey’s exports to and imports from Iran
T.T.E.: Turkey’s Total Exports
T.T.I.: Turkey’s Total Imports
I.T.E. : Iran’s Total Exports
I.T.I.: Iran’s Total Imports
Sources: Annuals of Foreign Trade 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999 from
Turkey’s Undersecreteriat of Foreign Trade, Direction of Trade Statistics
(1995), Direction of Trade Statistics (2000), Direction of Trade Statistics (June
2002)
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As it is shown in the table, Turkey’s exports decreased in the 1990s
while its imports were increasing. This is mostly because of the decrease in the
exports of Turkish products because of the above-mentioned reasons and
Turkey’s dependency on oil imports from Iran. As a result, there is an
increasing amount of deficit in Turkey’s balance of payments in its economic
relations with Iran.
The share of Iran in Turkey’s total exports decreased from 4.82 % in
1989 to 0.59 % in 1999. Except the sharp decline in 1991 and sharp increase in
1994, the share of Iran in Turkey’s total imports changes around 1.5% and 2 %.
Iran was ranked 14th in 1996 and 18th in 1997 among the top countries in
Turkey’s exports. Turkey’s share in Iranian exports and imports is much or less
stable after 1994.2
Iran exports petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, raw leather,
zinc and some other minerals to Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey exports
animal and vegetable oil, tyre, cotton fabric, plastics, and synthetic fibres to
Iran.3
Turkish-Iranian relations went through Economic Cooperation
Organization (ECO), Organization of the Islamic Conference Economic and
Trade Cooperation, the Turkish-Iranian Joint Economic Committees and
                                                                                                                                
1 John Calabrese, “Turkey and Iran: Limits of a Stable Relationship,” British Journal of Middle
Eastern Studies, vol.25, iss.1. (1999): p.7
2 Foreign Trade of Turkey 1996, Turkey’s Undersecreteriat of Foreign Trade;  Foreign Trade
of Turkey 1997, Turkey’s Undersecreteriat of Foreign Trade.
3 Türkiye’nin Ülkeler itibariyle Dış Ticareti ve Ülke Profilleri. Ankara: Dış Ticaret
Müsteşarlığı, 1998: p.212-213.
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economic delegations’ visits to each other. In addition to the memberships of
Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan, ECO enlarged geographically with the
new memberships of the former Soviet Republics, Azerbaijan, Kazakhistan,
Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. This extension enabled
the organization to act as a link among important areas of the Middle East,
Central Asia and Caucasia.4 However, neither Turkey and Iran nor the other
members of the organization really tried and succeeded to turn the organization
into a more functional one, which could result in development of economic
relations.5
After a cool period of relations during 1997, a development trend began
to be seen in the economic relations between Turkey and Iran. After the
messages of willingness to cooperate from both sides and low level
delegations’ visits, attempts to cooperate became concrete with the visit of
Iranian Foreign Minister, Kemal Kharrazi, to Turkey in January 2000.6
Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem, responded to this with his visit to Iran
with a group of Turkish businessmen in February 2001.7 These visits coincided
with the end of the gas pipeline problem and the start of gas purchase of
Turkey from Iran.8  Both sides define that moment as a turning point in
Turkish- Iranian relations, which is supposed to result in better economic
relations. Kemal Kharrazi mentioned this in his visit to Turkey: “A new page
will be opened between the two countries. It will result in better economic
                                                
4 Tehran Times (Tehran), 22 November 1999 in FBIS-NES-1999-1122
5 Kayhan International (Tehran), 10 June 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0615
6 Anatolia (Ankara), 19 January 2000 in FBIS-WEU-2000-0119
7 Anatolia (Ankara), 13 February 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-0213
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relations... Current trade volume between the two countries is far from the
desired level.” 9 On the other side, Ali Osman Ulusoy, Deputy Chairman of the
Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey(TOBB),  said
during the İsmail Cem’s visit to Iran: “ ...time has been lost in economic
relations between Turkey and Iran... I believe that there will be a very good
cooperation in the economic relations between the two countries.”10 After the
start of gas purchase from Iran, İsmail Cem pointed at the availability of the
environment for the development of the relations in February 2002: “The time
is now appropriate for Iran and Turkey to bolster bilateral political, economic
and security cooperation.” 11  During these visits and negotiations, the Turkish
side referred to opportunities for economic cooperation especially in
transportation, transit trade, textile, construction, electronic equipment and
household equipments12, while the Iranian side referred especially to crude oil,
electricity, natural gas and energy transportation.13 Iranian Tehran IRNA
agency announced periodically the figures of the volume of trade between the
two countries in 2001.14 This demonstrates to some extent the increasing
importance of Turkey in Iranian foreign trade.
                                                                                                                                
8 Turkey and Iran signed a gas purchase agreement in 1996 which could not be be started
because of a series of problems. This issue will be explained in detail in the following
parahraphs.
9  Anatolia (Ankara), 19 January 2000 in FBIS-WEU-2000-0119
10  Anatolia (Ankara), 13 February 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-0213
11  IRNA (Tehran), 19 February 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-0219
12  Anatolia (Ankara), 13 February 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-0213
13 Anatolia (Ankara), 26 January 2000 in FBIS-WEU-2000-0126
14 For these announcements see IRNA (Tehran), 27 August 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-0827 and
IRNA (Tehran), 15 November 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-1115 and IRNA (Tehran), 5 December
2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-1205 and   IRNA (Tehran), 4 February 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-
0204 and IRNA (Tehran), 16 February 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-0216 and IRNA (Tehran),  6
March 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-0306
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         Signature of a protocol which abolished the transit passage fee in
September 1998 also included some reforms in the border gate systems.15
Additionally, the two sides signed an agreement, which aimed at improvement
of trade relations and increasing the level of commercial exchanges.16 These
were important steps which led to economic rapprochement between the two
countries in the late 1990s. Both of these agreements were succeeded by the
Iran-Turkey Joint Economic and Trade Cooperation Committees. These
committees which deal more concretely with the issues and finalize them with
agreements can play an important role in the further development of economic
relations between the two countries.
Gas Agreement
        Turkey, with its growing population and developing industrialization and
urbanization, fell into an energy deficit in the 1990s. Among the main energy
sources of Turkey, natural gas was a cheaper alternative, which could decrease
the costs of the industry and was better for the environment. Natural gas
consumption of Turkey climbed steadily from 500 million cubic meters in
1987 to 6.6 billion cubic meters in 1995 and is expected to reach 30 billion
cubic meters by 2005 and 40 billion by 2010.17  Turkey bought 6 billion cubic
meters of gas from Russia in 1996. Turkey wanted to diversify the suppliers of
natural gas. In that regard, Iran was one of the leading alternatives of the
natural gas suppliers for Turkey. After a series of negotiations, Turkish Prime
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Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, signed a natural gas purchasing accord during his
visit to Iran on 12 August 1996.18  This was a $23 billion agreement, according
to which Turkey would begin to buy 3 billion cubic meters of gas in early 1999
and this amount would increase to 10 billion cubic meters in 2007. Both sides
had to construct the necessary pipelines and terminals within their border till
the starting date.
       Each side had some motives in signing this accord.  The motives of Turkey
were as follows:
1. Turkey aimed to diversify the suppliers of natural gas, which would end
dependence on one country and create a competitive environment that
could decraese the cost of gas.19
2. Among the alternative countries of the suppliers of gas, Iran was a
leading one with its growing capacity to produce natural gas. Iran
owned 12 percent of the world’s gas reserves.20
3. Iran had a geographical advantage in the transportation of gas in a
cheaper and safer route in a possible earthquake compared to Russian
and Turkmen alternatives21
4. The government planned to use the natural gas in the eastern and
southeastern regions of Turkey as soon as possible and saw this project
as an important factor in the development of these regions.22
                                                
18 “Gas Agreement” Presidents and Prime Ministers,  vol.5, iss. 6 (Nov-Dec 96): p. 24
19 Turkish Daily News (Ankara), 26 February 1996 in FBIS-WEU-96-044
20 Ahmad Kazemi, “Turkey-Iran gas pipeline project seen as enhancing strategic relations”
Abrar, 26 December 2001 in FBIS-NES-2002-0118
21 Ibid and IRNA (Tehran), 15 January 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-0115
22 Turkish Daily News (Ankara), 22 August 1996 in FBIS-WEU-96-165
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On the other hand, we can summarize the motives of Iran as:
1. Iran saw the experience of exporting its gas to Turkey, which is a
member of NATO and an ally of the US, as a good model for
neighboring countries such as Pakistan and Armenia which want
Iranian gas, or such countries such as Kuwait and Qatar which desire
Iranian water.23
2. Iran expected that this agreement would be a motivating factor, which
would accelerate its economic relations with Turkey in other fields.24
3. Iran wanted to use Turkey as a gateway for a natural gas pipeline to
European markets.25 Iranian officials explicitly announced, just after the
official start of the sale of gas to Turkey, that they desire to use the
pipeline for exports to Europe as well.26  Iran began to look for
partnership with European firms to find markets for its gas in Europe
and to compete with Russia and other suppliers of gas in Europe.27
Turkish Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, said just after coming from his
visit to Iran : “ ...we have entered a race with Rafsanjani on this issue... we will
complete the construction of the natural gas pipeline connecting Van to the
border within one year. Efforts will be exerted for the completion of a power
plant in Van within one year.28  However, things did not go as hoped as in
these sentences. Gökhan Yardım, Director General of the state-run pipeline
company (BOTAS), announced in April 1999 that Doğubeyazıt- Erzurum
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natural gas pipeline was completed 50% and the remaining Erzurum-Ankara
line , which was planned to be completed by the end of 2000, could be
extended to the first half of the year 2001.29 On the Iranian side, Iranian state
oil company said that they were ready to start. This brought the question of
compensation because of the ‘take or pay’ condition of the 1996 agreement.
Mohammed Nejad, Managing Director of Iranian national gas company,
demanded compensation from Turkey. Nejad claimed that Iran made all the
necessary preparations to supply gas to Turkey.30 He argued that Iran had to
pay back the loan from the bank for the financing of the pipeline and plants,
and this was planned to be paid back with the income from export of gas to
Turkey. However, Turkish Energy Minister, Cumhur Ersümer, claimed that
Iran had neither completed the section of the pipeline from Tabriz to the
Turkish border nor had it sufficient gas to sell to Turkey.31
 As a result of negotiations between the delegations of the two sides , the
beginning of the delivery of gas was delayed to 30 July 2001.32  Iran accepted
the reasons for the delay with understanding. Then the Turkish side announced
that Turkey accepted to pay compensation to Iran, the amount of which was
determined by the Turkish government, but no precise figure was explained to
the public.33 When the second deadline came, Turkey announced that it had
already completed construction of the pipeline on its territory.34 However,
Turkey wanted to test all gauging system on the Bazargan border point on the
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Iranian territory and Iran welcomed the Turkish request.35  After the
inspections of the system, Turkey accused a metering not being ready for
operation.36   Then a series of discussions and negotiations began again.
Finally, Turkey announced in December 2001 that it became satisfied about the
system in Iran and the first flow of gas began37, then in 22 January 2002
Iranian gas officially started flowing to Turkey.38
 Iran behaved in a tolerant manner to Turkey during this process.  Iran
knew the pressure over Turkey from the US. This was an important case for
Iran to overrun the embargo by the US and the motives for Iran to sell its gas to
Turkey, which was explained above, all of which led Iran to be more tolerant to
Turkey. The end of the problems and the start of the flowing of gas led the
Turkish and Iranian sides to be more optimistic about the future of economic
relations between the two countries. Turkish ambassador in Tehran, Selahattin
Kalpar, stated in an interview with the Tehran Times: “The gas project between
the two countries, apart from its economic benefits, illustrates the strategic and
political considerations that both Tehran and Ankara have made their priorities.
This shows how our nations can work together.”39 Also, in 24 December 2001,
Turkish State Minister, Mehmet Keçeciler, expressed Turkey’s readiness to sell
Iranian natural gas to Europe. 40 This willingness closely overlapped with
Iran’s desire to sell its gas to Europe over Turkish route and it was a signal of a
further cooperation between Iran and Turkey. Keçeciler also referred to the
                                                
35 IRNA (Tehran), 30 July 2001 in FBIS-NES-2001-0730
36 IRNA (Tehran), 10 November 2001 in FBIS-NES-1110
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growing imbalance in the trade between the two countries in favor of Iran and
pointed to the necessity to increase the exports of Turkey to Iran.
 Then in January 2002, Turkish Deputy Minister for Development
Affairs, Faruk Bal, paid a visit to Iran, aimed at preparing the ground for
cooperation between Iran and Turkey in the domain of house building and
reconstruction of the urban areas. In this visit, both Faruk Bal and Ali
Abdolalizadeh, Iran’s Minister of Housing and Urban Development, expressed
their willingness to cooperate.41
Turkey’s gas purchase from Iran was a good example showing the
plurality of the factors effecting the cooperation between the two states. In
order to make predictions about the future of relations, cooperation or conflict,
the following determinants should carefully be analyzed.
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: 
OBSTACLES TO AND INCENTIVES FOR COOPERATION 
 
 
5.1. Obstacles to Cooperation 
5.1.1. The US Factor 
 Kissinger defines the nature of US-Iran relations as: “There are few 
nations in the world with which the US has less reason to quarrel or more 
compatible interests than Iran.”1 Iran was one of the leading strategic allies of 
the US in the Middle East during the Cold War. However, the relations 
seriously worsened after the 1979 revolution of Iran. The new regime in Iran 
named the US ‘the Great Satan’, and called it the source of instability in the 
Middle East and the main enemy of the Muslims all over the world. The 
takeover of the US embassy in November 1979, the Iran-Contra Affair of 1986, 
and the Salman Rushdie Affair of 1989 were some of the events which further 
worsened the relations.2 On the other side, the US support to Iraq at various 
points during the Iran-Iraq War (1981-1988) and the loss of 300 people on an 
Iranian air flight which was shot down in 1988 by the USS Vincennes were 
some other events which deepened Iranian antagonism towards the US.3  
 
 Both sides have the reasons of their own to define the other as a 
potential threat and enemy. On the US side, firstly the US accuses Iran of 
attempting to export the Islamic revolution to other Muslim countries, and 
                                                 
1 Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy? (New York: Simon&Schuster, 2001), 
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accordingly of supporting the Islamic radicals and terrorists in the Middle East. 
Secondly, the US accuses Iran of being a major obstacle to the Middle East 
Peace Process, referring to its hostility to Israel. Maintenance of an 
independent and legitimate Israeli state has been one of the leading goals of the 
American policy in the Middle East.4 On the other hand, Iran has regarded 
Israel, together with the US, as the source of conflicts in the Middle East. 
Iranian leaders explicitly state their anti-Israeli ideas.5 As a result, Israeli factor 
constitutes an important obstacle to the US-Iran rapprochement. In addition to 
these, effective Israeli lobby in the US makes anti-Iranian propaganda, which 
leads to veto for any kind of a softer policy towards Iran.6 Thirdly, the US 
claims that Iran is producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including 
nuclear weapons, and perceives this as an important threat to the regional 
stability and to its vital interests in the region.7    
 
On the Iranian side, firstly, Iran regards the US military presence in the 
Persian Gulf as an indicator of the US imperialistic  aims and perceives it as a 
threat towards not only Iran, but also all the Middle Eastern countries. 
Secondly, Iran sees the US as an important factor that led to the weakness of its 
economy. The US froze billions of dollars of Iranian assets during the 1979 
revolution, and the US economic sanctions forbade significant foreign 
investments in Iran, and Iranian participation in big international projects. 
                                                                                                                                 
3 Chas. W. Freeman in “Symposium: US Policy Towards Iran, Time for a Change?” Middle 
East Policy 8, no.1. (2001) : p.1. 
4 James A. Bill, “The Politics of Hegemony: The US and Iran” Middle East Policy 8, no.3. 
(2001) : p. 95. 
5 See Chapter 1.1. for instance 
6 Bill, p.95. 
7 Kissinger, p.196-7. 
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Thirdly, the conservative mullahs in Iran perceive the US cultural influence as 
the most threatening attribute of ‘the great arrogance’.8  
 
 The US regarded Iran and Iraq as potential threats to its vital interests in 
the Middle East, and followed the policy of dual containment, through which 
the US used its political, economic and military strength to contain and 
confront Iran and Iraq. Regarding Iran, the Iran-Libya sanctions of 1996 was a 
major obstacle for Iranian economy since it forbade foreign investments more 
than 40 million dollars in Iran. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3.1., this 
was the main obstacle to Iranian participation in the Central Asian energy 
projects. Regarding Turkish-Iranian relations, the US factor was the main 
source of delay in Turkish purchase of Iranian gas, and the cancellation of the 
Turkish-Iranian cooperation on the transportation of Turkmen gas through Iran 
and Turkey to Europe. 
  
 After 11 September9 , the US became more sensitive on the issue of 
terrorism. Accordingly, it decided to follow a hard line policy against the states, 
which were accused of supporting terrorism. At that moment, Iran supported 
the US operation towards Afghanistan and this led to a relative softening in 
bilateral relations. Then, on December 2001, the President of Kazakhistan, 
Nursultan Nazarbayev, stated that American experts advised him on the Iranian 
                                                 
8 Geoffrey Kemp, “Iran: Can the United States Do a Deal?” The Washington Quarterly 24, 
no.1 (2001) : p.112-113. 
9 In 11 September 2001, two towers of the World Trade Center in New York were bombed by 
the terrorists and hundreds of Americans were killed. Islamist terrorist group of Usame bin 
Laden was accused of the incident. After this, the US started a heavy campaign to destroy the 
terrorist organizations and the states which support them.  
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route for the transportation of Caspian mineral resources. 10  These events 
increased the hopes of those who favored US-Iran rapprochement 11 . 
Neverthless, the events of 2002 disappointed these hopes. President Bush 
named Iran as a party of ‘evil axis’, accusing it of being one of the main 
countries supporting terrorism. 12  In these circumstances, it is difficult to 
foresee a significant change in US-Iran relations in the near future. 
Accordingly, the US policy of isolating Iran and the US sanctions remain an 
important obstacle to further Turkish-Iranian cooperation. 
 
5.1.2. Ideological Differences 
  
The Islamic Republic of Iran is based on Islamic values, whereas the 
Turkish Republic is a secular and democratic country. In both countries, there 
are groups who are radical defenders of their respective regimes. These groups 
sometimes perceive foreign relations through ideological criteria and 
prejudices. Especially, during the conflictual periods between the two countries, 
these groups increase the tension with their statements and propaganda. 
Therefore, these groups constitute an obstacle to further cooperation between 
the two states. 
 
In Turkey, there is an Atatürkist-secular elite, including the armed 
forces, the leading members of the media, and a significant number of 
politicians and bureaucrats. This group is highly sensitive about the 
preservation of the secularist regime, and perceives the Islamic Republic of 
                                                 
10 Zaman (Istanbul), 10 April 2001. 
11 The arguments of this group will be explained in the following parts, Chapter 5.6. 
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Iran as a potential threat to the regime. Both during the conflictual periods of 
Turkish-Iranian relations and the attempts to increase Turkish-Iranian 
cooperation, this group started a heavy campaign against Iran. After the 
assassinations of prominent Turkish academicians and journalists in the early 
1990s, there were claims that these murders were Iran related. One of these 
murdered persons was Uğur Mumcu, and his funeral was a manifestation of the 
anger of secularists in Turkey towards Iran. An approximate number of 100 
000 participants the funeral cried: ‘Mullahs go to Iran’, ‘Turkey will never be 
Iran’, and ‘Death to Sharia’.13 
 
 Turkish pro-Islamist Prime Minister, Necmettin Erbakan, followed a 
foreign policy to establish better ties with the Middle Eastern and Islamic 
countries, including Iran. This policy grew concern among this group. On 
August 1996, the Turkish army and security officials gave Erbakan a file 
warning about Iran and Turkish-Iranian rapprochement.14  Erbakan’s insistence 
on this policy and moreover, his insistence on his radical Islamic approaches 
led to the post modern coup d’etat of 28th February 1997. The Turkish army 
exerted full pressure on Erbakan government and forced him to resign. Iranian 
envoy’s provocative speech in the Jerusalem Night in Sincan was an important 
factor which increased the concerns of the Turkish secularist elite. The Turkish 
army does not trust the Iranian administration. In an interview on August 2000, 
Turkish Chief of the General Staff, Hüseyin Kıvrıkoğlu stated that Iran did not 
                                                                                                                                 
12 Sami Kohen, “Iran, Niçin Şimdi?” Milliyet, 6 February 2002 in FBIS-NES-2002-0207 
13 Nur B. Criss, “Arduous Diplomacy; Turkish- Iranian Relations (1979-1996)” (Unpublished 
Article, Bilkent University,1996) :p.20. 
14 IRNA (Tehran), 21 May 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0521 
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maintain a sincere approach towards the security problems of the two 
countries.15  
 
On the other hand, Turkish media started a heavy campaign against Iran 
during the assassination crisis of 2000.16 Oktay Ekşi, the editor of Hürriyet 
daily, argued that Iran supported any form of activity that would stir up trouble 
in Turkey.17  Another journalist in the same daily described Iranian people 
under the Islamic regime as having ‘embraced a snake as a savior’. He argued 
that the regime oppressed the Iranian people for exactly 21 years and Iranian 
people lost their personality, regardless of their long history and culture.18 
During the demonstrations in Iran in July 2000, Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent 
Ecevit, named Iranian government as an ‘oppressive regime’ and argued that 
the Iranian people could not be expected to bear the outdated regime of 
oppression further.19  
 
Turan Moralı, Turkish ambassador in Tehran at that time, complains 
about  attitude of Turkish media during this crises. He argues that there was 
misinformation in Turkish media. For example, Turkish media announced that 
Turkish Interior Minister, Sadettin Tantan, transmitted a documentary file of 
170 pages through the Turkish embassy in Tehran, including proofs of Iranian 
support to the PKK. Being the Turkish ambassador in Tehran at that time, he 
denied transmission of such a file. Additionally, he says that Turkish media 
                                                 
15 Jomhuri-ye Eslami (Tehran), 22 May 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0607 
16 For some examples see Şükrü Elekdağ, “İran’ın Elindeki Kan,” Milliyet, 17 January 2000; 
Emin Çölaşan, “Mektuplar,Tepkiler,” Hürriyet, 15 September 2001Fatih Altaylı, “İran ve 
Türkiye”, Hürriyet, 25 Eylül 2001; Enis Beberoğlu, “Tahran İki Cami Arasında Beynamaz”, 
Hürriyet, 3 October 2001. 
17 Oktay Eksi, “Gerçek Suçlu İran,” Hürriyet, 23 January 2000. 
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claimed that the congress of the PKK was summoned in Iran. However, he 
argues that the congress summoned in the caves on the areas of the Turkish-
Iranian border, where there is not Iranian order.  He argues that such 
misinformation unnecessarily increased the tension and tightened the relations 
between the two countries.20  
 
On the other side, Iranian hard liners reacted against the anti-Iranian 
campaign in the Turkish media. They harshly criticized the secular regime in 
Turkey.  Iranian media linked the assassinations of journalists in Turkey with 
the Zionist regime and Mossad. It was stated in Tehran IRNA on May 2000 
that : ‘The propaganda was waged at the time when brother of one of the 
assassinated journalists accused Mossad of having a hand in the murder and 
said that current measures taken by Turkey were aimed at concealing the 
vicious attempts of Mossad.’21 Ali Gilani, a columnist in Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 
accused the Turkish media of being financially supported by the Zionists: 
‘During the last ten days the secularists’ media organizations, which make their 
living from the Zionists’ pockets, launched widespread propaganda against the 
Islamic Republic of Iran,…’ He claimed that the campaign aimed at preparing 
the ground for triggering clashes with the Islamic Republic of Iran.22 Another 
journalist, A.Saleh, argued that each time the Turkish secular regime faced a 
                                                                                                                                 
18 Tufan Türenç, “Bu Fundemantalistlere Bir Ders Olsun,” Hürriyet, 23 February 2000. 
19 Hürriyet (Istanbul), 14 July 1999 in Olson, p.878.  
20 Turan Moralı, “Turkey and Iran” The Institute of Foreign Policy, Ankara, March 2002 
21 IRNA (Tehran), 21 May 2000 in FBIS-NES-2000-0521 
22 Ali Gilani, “The Secularists’ Disgrace Following the Recent Arrests” Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 22 
May 2000. 
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crisis, it referred to Iran as the big danger and set out to incite public opinion 
with nationalistic sentiments.23   
 
Announcements of Turkish politicians, seriously criticizing the regime 
in Iran, increased the antagonism of this group towards the secular regime in 
Turkey. For example, Turkish Prime Minister, Bülent Ecevit, expressed on 17 
May 2000 that Iran for years had provided shelter to separatist terrorists and 
was still trying to export its revolution. 24  Hamid Ziaiparvar, responded in 
Moshad Khorasan on 20 May 2000 :  
 
Projection is a tactic that is widely used in politics. These days, we are 
seeing that some countries (such as Turkey, Libya and even Israel) blaming and 
projecting their internal problems on the Islamic republic of Iran. The Turkish 
Prime Minister has made accusations against the Islamic Republic of Iran… 
Zionist-influenced countries and media are inclined to attribute all terrorist 
attacks to the Islamic republic of Iran, in the hope of ruining Islam’s global 
image while diverting attention from their internal problems.25 
 
 
5.1.3. Clash of Interests 
 
 Some problems and rivalries of 1990s could be resolved but still remain 
as a potential source of competition and conflict in early 2002. The beginning 
of 1990s was a period of rivalry between the two countries in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia with their pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist policies. Nowadays, both 
                                                 
23 A.Saleh, “ What is Turkey’s Regime seeking” Jomhuri-ye Eslami, 29 May 2000 
24 Hürriyet(Istanbul), 17 May 2000 in Olson, p.885. 
25 Hamid Ziaiparvar, “Projecting Globally” Mashhad Khorasan, 20 May 2000 
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of them left such ideological strategies regarding the region. None of the sides 
could succeed in the bright and hopeful plans of the early 1990s. Each has 
successes and failures on certain aspects. Turkey was a better model for the 
newly independent states with its democratic, secular and westernized structure. 
Turkey established better cultural and educational ties with these states. Its 
private sector was more successful in their investments. However, Turkey’s 
political and economic strength could not meet the expectations of these states 
to accept Turkey as a big brother and leader. On the Iranian side, Islamic 
approach was not well accepted in these states. Iran has an obvious 
geographical advantage for these states to open to the world markets. However, 
it could not participate in big projects of  production and transportation of 
mineral resources of the region because of the US objection. Instead, Iran was 
successful in smaller projects with its swap formula and in railway 
transportation.  
 
Nowadays, Iran wants to cooperate with Turkey to take a share in the 
projects of the transportation of mineral resources. Besides its willingness to 
cooperate with Iran on Iranian and Turkmen gas projects, Turkey is in a 
dilemma regarding the role of Iran in the region. On the one hand, Iranian 
owned gas reserves and its geographical advantage to transport Turkmen gas to 
Turkey constitutes an economic option for Turkey to solve its energy problem 
and to earn from the transportation of gas and oil. On the other hand, there is 
the US opposition to any act increasing the role of Iran in the region, which 
will damage the US policy of isolating Iran, and Turkey does not want to 
damage its vital interests regarding its strategic alliance with the US. 
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Additionally, Turkish policy makers may think that the increasing role of Iran 
will mean increasing Iranian domination over the NIS, which will decrease the 
Turkish influence over the region. 
 
The lack of authority in northern Iraq, the potential threats from Syria, 
Greece and Iran, and the permission of Syria to Greece to use its airspace in a 
war with Turkey increased the insecurity of Turkey in the region in the 
beginning of the 1990s.Through its strategic cooperation with Israel, Turkey 
aimed at increasing its security towards these threats. However, Turkish-Israeli 
cooperation created new problems for Turkey. Iran is anxious about Israeli 
presence on Turkish border with Iran and its intelligence activities. Turkish 
officials’ announcements that this cooperation did not aim at any third party are 
not enough to end Iranian concerns. Unless Turkey convinced Iran about the 
context of the agreements that they do not violate Iran’s security, it would 
remain as a problem in the minds of Iranian decision-makers regarding their 
relations with Turkey.  
 
There are a significant number of claims that Iran is working on a 
program of producing weapons of mass destruction and is trying to produce 
nuclear weapons. Despite the US objection, Russia continues its help Iran in its 
nuclear program. Additionally, the Iran missile program is perceived as a more 
concrete threat for Turkey. Iran is claimed to be working on Shahab-4 and 
Shahab-5 missiles which have ranges of 2000 and 5000 km. The production of 
these missiles will certainly be more threatening not only for Turkey but also 
for other countries in the region. This issue did not reach to a level of crisis 
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between the two countries, but remains as a potential source of instability in the 
region and in the bilateral relations of the two countries.    
 
 
5.2. Incentives for Cooperation 
5.2.1. The End of Conflicts 
  
There were a number of issues in the 1990s which led to conflicts and 
rivalries between Turkey and Iran. By 2002, most of these issues ended, either 
solved by diplomatic ways through negotiations or fell off from the agenda.  
 
 The early and the late 1990s were dominated with assassination crises 
and Turkish accusations of Iran of exporting the Islamic regime to Turkey. The 
testimonies of the suspects in Turkey about the Iranian link of these 
assassinations and Iran’s aim of establishing an Islamic regime in Turkey, 
combined with the harsh expressions of the politicians of both Turkey and Iran 
led to the crisis in bilateral relations. On the Iranian side, they claimed that 
Turkey supported the armed opposition organization of the Iranian regime 
(Mujaheddin-e Khalq Organization-MKO) through allowing its activities in 
Turkey. In response, Turkey accused Iran of killing member of the Iranian 
opposition in Turkey through its agents using diplomatic passports.  The 
tension increased with the campaigns of the media of both countries. However, 
there was a change in Iran beginning with the presidents Hashemi Rafsanjani 
and Mohammed Khatemi about the policy of not exporting the revolution. 
Rafsanjani’s ‘pragmatic peace’ and Khatemi’s ‘democratic peace’ policies led 
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the Iranian government to establish better ties with its neighbors and to leave 
the policy of exporting the revolution. In fact, most of these activities were 
planned by the forces outside the control of the government, and especially 
Khatemi’s government terminated their activities. On the other side, Turkey 
used this crisis for its internal struggle against reactionism and pressing Iran to 
cut off  any kind of support to the PKK. 
 
 Border security problems and Iranian support of the PKK were other 
sources of tension between the two countries. In addition to the media and the 
politicians, it was the military in Turkey, which was highly sensitive on the 
issue. Turkey accused Iran of allowing the PKK to act freely on Iranian 
territory and to pass freely from the Iranian border to Turkish territory. 
Nowadays, with the capture of the leader of the PKK and the destruction of 
most of the military capabilities of the organization, the PKK issue is not the 
number one security problem of Turkey. As a result of a series of negotiations 
between the security committees of the two countries, there is now better 
control on the borders and both countries promised not to allow any kind of 
activities on their territory against the security of the other.  
 
5.2.2. Harmony of Interests 
  
Turkey and Iran have some common interests, which make cooperation 
attractive for them. During the visit of Turkish President Süleyman Demirel on 
July 1994, the following areas for cooperation were negotiated: The transport 
of goods from Iran to Europe via Turkey and from Turkey to Asian countries 
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and the Persian Gulf via Iran; connecting the railways of the two countries; the 
construction of roads; strengthening ECO; the transmission of Turkmen gas 
from Iran to Turkey; and collaboration on security matters. 26 These are the 
summary of areas of cooperation on which both countries have common 
interests. 
 
 Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) can be a framework for the 
cooperation between the two countries and for larger cooperation projects 
among the other members. It was established in 1985 by Turkey, Iran and 
Pakistan, and was enlarged with the participation of Afghanistan and the newly 
independent Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
and Turkmenistan). ECO aimed at facilitating cooperation among member 
states and coordinate their regional activities in order to prevent unnecessary 
competition. The formation of alternative organizations as the Organization for 
Cooperation of Caspian Sea Countries, with the leadership of Iran, and the 
Black Sea Economic Cooperation with the leadership of Turkey, caused some 
confusion. For a better functioning of the organization as a framework of 
cooperation, the founding members should coordinate their efforts and interests, 
and set aside their independent plans.27 
 
Under the framework of the organization, Turkey and Iran worked on 
interregional road and railway projects. They managed the railway project to 
put into practice.  With the opening of Mashad-Saraks-Tejen railway on May 
                                                 
26 Kayhan, 26 July 1994 in Tschanguiz  H. Pahlavan, “ Turkish- Iranian Relations An Iranian 
View,” in Reluctant Neighbor, ed. Henri J. Barkey (Washington, D.C. : United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 1996) :p.91 
27 Pahlavan, p.90. 
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1996, Iran linked its railway with Turkmenistan. There was an existing railway 
system among the Central Asian countries, therefore this meant linking not 
only with Turkmenistan but also with all the Central Asian countries. Then 
Turkey linked its domestic network with Iran in order to link with  Central Asia. 
This meant the establishment of a network from Central Asia to Europe. 
Establishment of free trade zones can also be an attractive way to increase the 
trade between the two countries. Maku, an Iranian city near the borders of 
Turkey, Armenia and Nakhichevan is suggested to be an example for these 
zones.28  
 
 As previously mentioned, Turkey and Iran are an attractive routes for 
the transportation of Central Asian mineral resources to Europe and to the 
world markets. The two sides worked together with Turkmenistan on the 
project of transporting Turkmen gas via Iran and Turkey to Europe. Three 
parties reached a consensus on the project, but political considerations (the US 
veto) did not allow them to put this into practice. 
 
 Turkey is suffering from trade deficits in its foreign trade with Iran. 
Both sides at several times stated that the volume of trade between the two 
countries is far from the desired level. In the light of the projects on the areas 
of cooperation mentioned in the first paragraph, the volume of trade between 
Iran and Turkey can be increased, which will bring significant gains for each 
side. However,  most necessary  for this is the ‘political will’.   
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., p.91. 
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5.2.3. Failure of the American Approach and Following the European Path 
 
 Nowadays, there are discussions within the US regarding the US policy 
towards Iran. On the one hand, there is a group favoring the continuation of the 
policy of isolating Iran. They argue that Iran continues its actions, like 
supporting terrorism and production of weapons of mass destruction, which 
damages the vital interests of the US. On the other hand, there is a group 
arguing that the US policy of isolating Iran failed. They argue that sanctions 
did not lead Iranians to soften on the Iranian hard liners; instead it intensified 
their antagonism and damaged the US companies’ economic interests.29 They 
refer to the common interests of the US and Iran on the issues of the Gulf 
security, Iraq and the Central Asia.30 The end of the US-Iran conflict would 
lighten the US load for maintaining security in the Middle East, would loosen 
the growing ties between Russia and Iran, and would open the market for US 
firms.31 Fuller and Kemp suggest that Iranian pragmatism may be a key factor 
in the rapprochement. Khomeini himself announced that the Iranian national 
interests took priority over Islam. If it can be shown that the US-Iran 
rapprochement is in the interests of Iran, Iranian pragmatism will fasten the 
establishment of closer relations.32 
                                                 
29 See Symposium: “US Policy Towards Iran, Time for a Change?” Middle East Policy 8, no.1. 
(2001); Syposium: “The End of Dual Containment: Iraq, Iran and Smart Sanctions” Middle 
East Policy 8, no.3. (2001); James A. Bill, “The Politics of Hegemony: The US and Iran” 
Middle East Policy 8, no.3. (2001); Murray Eiland III, “Mixed Messages and Carpet 
Diplomacy: Opportunities for Détente with Iran,” Middle East Policy 6, no.2. (1998).  
30 For details see Graham Fuller, “Repairing US-Iran Relations,” Middle East Policy 6, no.2. 
(1998): p.143 and Kemp. P.109. 
31 Kemp, p.109. 
32 Fuller, p.142-143 and Kemp, p.123. 
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In his article, ‘The Politics of Hegemony: The US and Iran”, Bill 
explains the US policy towards Iran with the hegemon theory. He argues that 
the US became the one global hegemonic power after the collapse of the USSR, 
and lacked a mission in the absence of a clear powerful adversary. He 
continues his argument that then the global hegemon scanned the world for 
new threats and discovered a group of relatively independent regional 
hegemons, whose influence dominated particular regions of the world. These 
regional hegemons consistently resisted the pressure of the global hegemon. 
Then the global hegemon labeled them ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states. Iran was one 
of these regional hegemons of particular concern to the US.33 Referring to the 
shared interests of Iran and the US, and the relative importance of both states in 
the international stage, Bill foresees a US-Iran détente as a natural development. 
However, he points to the necessity that the global hegemon needs to engage 
the regional hegemon as a sovereign independent member of the community of 
nations, and the regional hegemon, in turn, needs to eschew the use of extra-
legal violence and soften harsh rhetoric.34    
 
The Atlantic Council Report was prepared in the US by a group of 60 
policy makers on the US-Iran relations. The report argues that the US sanctions 
and embargo failed to alter Iranian political behavior. It suggests the lifting of 
the sanctions, coordination of the US foreign policy with its European allies, 
improvement of relations through the use of commerce and trade, and cultural 
                                                 
33 Bill, p.91-92. 
34 Ibid., p.97. 
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and educational engagement which can prepare the way for political 
engagement.35 
 
Takeyh modeled the US-Iranian relations on Sino-American relations. 
The US and China disagree in some respects, but also have certain common 
objectives. Accordingly, they actively attempt to reach consensus on some of 
these issues. He argues that the US-Iran case is similar. They have certain 
objectives in common. He suggests that Iran and the US should move toward a 
new paradigm whereby they compete and cooperate at the same time.36  
 
 Kurzman criticizes the US policy towards Iran on three points. Firstly, 
the US government continues to provide fodder for the Iranian isolationists by 
making interventionist statements. Secondly, US policy experts continue to 
frame negotiations as a means of altering the policies of Iran or overthrowing it. 
He argues that negotiations have a better chance of succeeding if the US seeks 
only the benefits of trade and investment, rather than pursuing economic 
relations as a means to political ends. Thirdly, the US refused to negotiate with 
the hard liners. He suggests including them in the talks.37  
  
 Coming to Turkish-Iranian relations, in fact, Turkish security and 
economic calculations about Iran do not properly coincide with the US’. For 
example, preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear power is not Turkey’s 
number one foreign policy priority. More significantly, there are economic 
                                                 
35 Ibid., p.89-91. 
36 Ray Takeyh in Symposium: “US Policy Towards Iran, Time for a Change?” Middle East 
Policy 8, no.1. (2001) : p.8. 
37 Kurzman, p.71. 
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incentives for Turkey to maintain its relations with Iran, one of its major 
trading partners in the region. Economic embargo against Iran meant the loss 
of $250 million of Turkish exports to Iran and about $700 million of imports 
from that country. Also, it deprives Turkey’s eastern provinces of Agri, 
Hakkari and Van of a lucrative border trade with Iran of about $27 million.38 
As previously mentioned in detail in Chapter 3.1, because of US objections, 
Turkey could not conclude a project with Iran and Turkmenistan on the 
transportation of Turkmen gas through a pipeline via Iran and Turkey to 
Europe, which would bring Turkey significant economic gains and increase its 
strategic importance. 
 
 During the hot debates of 1996 and 1997 in Turkey about Turkey’s 
rapprochement with Iran, İlnur Çevik, the editor of Turkish Daily News, 
criticized the US policy towards Iran and its effects on Turkey. Çevik accused 
the US of following a double standard policy that it supports dictatorship in the 
Middle East and Latin America, while it isolates the Islamic regime in Iran.39 
Also, he criticized the US embargo and he argued that the US had no right to 
ask Turkey for a sacrifice, mentioning that Turkey had to establish economic 
ties with its neighbors in order to survive.40  
 
 Europeans disagree with the US policy of isolating Iran. Instead, they 
followed a policy called ‘critical dialogue’. German Foreign Minister, Klaus 
                                                 
38 Mahmut B. Aykan, “Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations in Concerning Persian 
Gulf Security in the Post- Cold War Era: 1989-1995,” Middle East Journal 50, no.3. (1996) : 
p.353-354. 
39 İlnur Çevik, “Is Iran the Only victim of American Double Standards,” Turkish Daily News, 
15 August 1996 in FBIS-WEU-96-161. 
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Kinkel, the principal architect of this policy, argued in 1992 that it was 
essential to move Iran toward responsible cooperation with Europe and the rest 
of the world through engaging it economically and diplomatically, rather than 
isolating it. Despite the interruptions in the relations because of the death fatwa 
on Salman Rushdie in 1989 and the decision of the Berlin Court on the 
Mykonos affair in 1997 41 , the Europeans did not entirely terminate their 
economic ties. The Europeans’ emphasis on Iran’s geostrategy makes it critical 
for peace and stability in the Persian Gulf. On the other hand, Europeans argue 
that the continuation of a critical dialogue would strengthen moderates in Iran, 
while the isolation of Iran will strengthen the conservatives.42   
 
 The isolationists in the US criticize Europeans for calculating short-
term economic interests while ignoring security interests. They claim that a 
nuclear power terrorist Iran will in the long run be more threatening to Europe 
than to the US.43 They argue that there is not a real change in Iran, since it still 
tries to export the revolution, aims at producing nuclear weapons and refuses 
official dialogue with the US.44 
 
 Under these circumstances, being a strategic ally of the US on the one 
hand and aiming to be a full member of the European Union on the other, 
                                                                                                                                 
40 İlnur Çevik, “Suspicions of the West About Refah,” Turkish Daily News, 14 August 1996 in 
FBIS-WEU-96-161. 
41 Rushdie Affair: Salman Rushdie is the author of the Satanic Verses, which ridiculed 
fundamental beliefs of Islam. Ayetollah Khomeini placed death sentence(fatwa) on Rushdie in 
1989. Mykonos Affair: Four Iranian Kurdish dissidents were killed in Mykonos restaurant in 
Berlin on 17 September 1992 and the Berlin court ruled that the murders were ordered by the 
highest levels of the government in Iran. 
42 (Mahmood Monshipouri, “ Iran’s Search for the New Pragmatism” Middle East Policy 6, 
no.2. 1998) :p.104. 
43 Kissinger, p.201. 
44 Ibid., p.200. 
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Turkey faces a dilemma in choosing which policy to follow. Turkish security 
elite chose the US approach in most of the cases till today. Broader security 
perceptions of Turkey prevailed over the regional ones and its economic 
interests. Nowadays, there is a growing tendency within Turkey that it should 
follow the European path in its relations with Iran. Bulent Aras, an academic 
foreign policy expert in Turkey, argues that Europe has a better foreign policy 
perception of the Middle East with its deeper historical experiences. He 
suggests Turkey to follow the European path, combined with the calculation of 
the global and regional realities and the necessary flexibility in foreign policy 
decision making. 45  Ferai Tinc, a columnist in Hurriyet daily, argues that 
Turkey will be located at the starting point of the trade route which is being 
established as a result of the closer relations between Iran and Europe. She 
claims that this will bring new opportunities to Turkey. She argues that the US 
approach marginalizes Iran, whereas the European line intends to draw Iran to 
a place where common values can be shared. She states that Turkey should 
choose to live with a peaceful neighbor by following the European path.46   
 
 Turkish President A.Necdet Sezer had decided not to attend the ECO 
summit in Tehran on June 2000. Two years later, Sezer paid a visit on June 
2002 to Tehran together with a group of high-ranking officials and leading 
businessmen. 47  On the other hand, the general secretary of the National 
Security Council, Tunçer Kılıç, suggested Turkey to follow a new 
comprehensive foreign policy including Iran and Russia, without ignoring the 
                                                 
45 Bülent Aras, “ Türkiye ve İran: Yeni Dönem, Yeni Fırsatlar” Zaman, 19 June 2002 
46 Ferai Tınç, “İran’la Avrupa Yolunu İzlemek” Hürriyet, 10 September 2001 
47 Özgen Acar, “Sezer’in Tahran Seferi” Cumhuriyet, 11 June 2002. 
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US factor.48 What made this statement more interesting was because it was 
spelled by the military wing, which was highly cautious about Turkey’s 
relations with Iran and had several times accused Iran of working against the 
security of Turkey. These two events, combined with the growing arguments 
explained above, may be the indicators of the beginning of a reformulation of 
Turkish foreign policy towards Iran. However, it is difficult to make a 
prediction about the future, because these events are recent and their 
consequences are not yet clear. 
 
 In conclusion, this study shows that uncertain ground of Turkish-
Iranian relation continues. However, the experiences of the 1990s and the early 
2000s provided us to point the determinants for the future. In order to 
understand Turkish-Iranian relations, one should calculate multi-dimensions of 
the relations. A development in domestic politics can effect the regional 
dimension of the relations, while changes in the international system and its 
reflections on the region can change the foreign policy calculations of the two 
countries. As a result of an examination the relations after 1990, we can 
determine the obstacles to and the incentives for cooperation. The US remains 
the main obstacle to cooperation. Unless its perception of Iran as a rogue state 
change and it reformulates its policy of confronting and containing Iran, it will 
forbid its strategic partner, Turkey, to improve its relations with Iran. 
Additionally, ideological differences, which became concrete on the radical 
defenders of their regime within each side, is a potential source of increase of 
tension between the two countries. Finally, clash of interests constitute another 
                                                 
48 Emin Çölaşan, “Askerin Ağzından İran” Hürriyet, 9 March 2002 
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obstacle to cooperation. Turkish and Iranian desires to be more influential 
actors in the region lead them to compete. Rivalry in the Central Asia and the 
Caucasus, Turkey’s strategic cooperation with Israel, and Iran’s armament 
program are examples of this competition.  
 
On the other hand, there are some incentives for cooperation. Firstly, 
the conflictual issues of the 1990s, such as Iran’s exportation of its regime, 
border problems, Iran’s support to the PKK and Turkey’s support to the MKO 
has ended. They are mostly resolved or fell off from the agenda. Secondly, 
there is harmony of interests in Turkish-Iranian economic cooperation. There is 
a number of areas of cooperation such as transportation of goods, transmission 
of mineral resources and increasing the volume of trade. Thirdly, debate on the 
success of the US policy of Iran may lead a possible change in the US policy, 
which accordingly leads to dominant changes in the course of Turkish-Iranian 
relations. Also, alternative European policy of Iran will certainly increase the 
cooperation between the two countries. 
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